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INTRODUCTION 
  
 Probably no topic has been more central to legal scholarship than inequality.  But 
one aspect of the problem has been insufficiently discussed.   This is the question of the 
time-slice.  Should egalitarians be concerned with the inequality of individuals’ well-
being or resources over their lifetimes, or with inequality during what I shall 
“sublifetimes,” such as annual or even momentary inequality?   
 
 This Article engages the time-slice problem, and does so from the perspective of 
welfarism.  In other words, I assume that the “currency” for equality is human well-
                                                 
1 Leon Meltzer Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to workshop participants 
at the law schools of Arizona State, Boalt Hall, Chicago-Kent, Georgetown, Harvard, Illinois, and the 
University of Pennsylvania, for their very helpful comments. 
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being,2 and then ask whether the legal system should aim to secure the equality of 
individual lifetime or sublifetime well-being.  My conclusion is that the lifetime view is 
more attractive. 
 
 Part I of the Article summarizes the welfarist framework for thinking about 
problems of policy choice.  Among other things, it explains my reasons for addressing the 
time-slice problem from a welfarist rather than extra-welfarist perspective. 
In short: the concept of “well-being” is an inclusive one, potentially encompassing a 
range of objective goods or aspects of human flourishing, and not merely preference 
satisfaction.  Further, welfarists need not be utilitarians.  The formalism of an “equity-
regarding social welfare function” provides a tool for thinking about law and policy 
which is analytically rigorous and sensitive to distributional considerations.    
 
 Part II defends the lifetime view. The time-slice problem, while generally 
overlooked by legal scholars, has generated a small body of philosophical scholarship.  
Although the dominant view, here, is a lifetime view, a number of dissenters have 
advanced important challenges to this position, which I grapple with in Part II.   
Specifically, Derek Parfit has presented a deflationary picture of personal identity over 
time which, he suggests, supports a sublifetime view.  And Dennis McKerlie has argued 
that -- quite apart from considerations of personal identity -- there are powerful intuitions 
supporting the sublifetime view. Part II responds to McKerlie’s and Parfit’s challenges to 
the lifetime view.   
 
 The thrust of Part II is that the optimal distributively-sensitive legal rules and 
institutions -- within the welfarist framework -- are those identified by the application of 
an equity-regarding social welfare function to lifetime rather than sublifetime utilities.  
But what, exactly, does that mean given conditions of uncertainty?  If the policymaker is 
uncertain about the distribution of lifetime utilities, should she aim to equalize the 
distribution of expected lifetime well-being, or should she instead focus on the expected 
degree of inequality of actual lifetime well-being?   Should she care about equality of 
expectations (the “ex ante” approach), or about expected inequality (the “ex post” 
approach).  Drawing on my work with Chris Sanchirico, Part III clarifies the distinction 
between the two approaches and summarizes the case for the “ex post” approach. 
 
 The upshot of Parts II and III is a framework for thinking about legal rules and 
institutions which cares about equality, focuses on lifetime rather than sublifetime well-
being, and is outfitted for choice under uncertainty.  Parts IV and V survey the multiple, 
concrete implications of this account.  In particular, I discuss what a lifetime view implies 
for the measurement of inequality; for the measurement of poverty; for the design of the 
tax-and-transfer system; for the contested question whether non-tax instruments, such as 
environmental regulations or expenditures on public goods, should ever be used for 
redistributive purposes; and (because the answer to this question is, plausibly, yes) for 
how policy-analytic tools, such as cost-benefit analysis, should be rendered sensitive to 
distributive considerations.  
 
                                                 
2 See generally Richard Arneson, Welfare Should be the Currency of Justice, 30 CAN. J. PHIL. 497 (2000). 
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 Whether or not the reader is ultimately moved by my arguments in favor of a 
lifetime view, this Article should at least persuade her that the choice between lifetime 
and sublifetime perspectives --in short, the time-slice problem -- is a vital one for law and 
policy.  Consider the following examples, discussed (among others) in Parts IV and V. 
 
-- A very large body of work within applied economics applies quantitative 
metrics of inequality, such as the so-called Gini coefficient, to the distribution of 
income.  The bulk of this scholarship attends to the distribution of annual income, 
but there are scholars who have tried to measure the inequality of lifetime income, 
using longitudinal data, proxies for lifetime income (such as annual consumption), 
or simulation models.  The upshot of this research is that the distribution of 
lifetime income is more equal, both in the U.S. and abroad, than the distribution 
of annual income.  Further, time trends may look different.  For example, the 
inequality of annual income has been increasing in the U.S., but the inequality of 
lifetime income has not. 3 
 
 -- Health economists have followed the lead of the income-inequality scholars, 
and have started to measure the population distribution of health or longevity.  
Here, too, the lifetime and sublifetime perspectives about the extent or time trend 
of inequality can differ.4  For a simple example, imagine an outbreak of a fatal 
disease that tends to affect those who are already in chronically bad health.  From 
a lifetime perspective, the outbreak increases inequality. Those affected by the 
disease are, generally, already badly off in terms of lifetime well-being. The 
disease lowers the lifetime well-being of this badly off group, by shortening their 
lifespans.  But, from a sublifetime perspective, the effect of the disease on 
inequality is more ambiguous.  The outbreak may actually reduce annual or 
momentary health inequality, going forward, because those who remain in the 
population tend to be in better health.5 
  
 -- Tax scholars have long sought to measure the “incidence” of taxes.  A tax is 
“regressive” if its burden, as a fraction of the taxpayer’s income, tends to decrease 
as the taxpayer’s income increases.  A tax is “progressive” if its burden tends to 
increase as the taxpayer’s income increases.  Recent incidence scholarship shows 
that the time-slice problem matters critically for evaluating the degree of 
regressivity/progressivity of various taxes.  Are we asking about the tax burden as 
a fraction of annual income or of lifetime income?  Sales and excise taxes are, 
famously, regressive from a sublifetime perspective, but are much less so from a 
lifetime perspective.  The personal income tax is progressive from a sublifetime 
perspective, but is less progressive from a lifetime perspective. 
 
-- Poverty researchers have begun to examine “chronic” poverty.  Traditional 
poverty metrics look to whether the individual falls below some periodic or 
momentary threshold with respect to some attainment critical to well-being - for 
                                                 
3 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
4 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
5 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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example, whether the individual’s annual income is below the poverty line, or 
whether he is badly nourished or lacks shelter at present. Chronic poverty metrics 
look to whether the individual repeatedly falls below the periodic threshold, or 
whether his long-term attainments fall below some long-term threshold. It turns 
out that the determinants of transient and chronic poverty, and the appropriate 
policy responses, are quite different.  Chronic poverty results from low human 
capital and geographic or social isolation.  Individuals who experience transient 
rather than chronic poverty generally do so because of transitory “shocks” from 
which they rebound, such as the loss of a wage-earner in the household, an 
economic downturn, or a natural disaster.   Policy tools such as unemployment 
insurance or disaster relief, which mitigate transient but not chronic poverty, will 
tend to look quite attractive from the sublifetime perspective but less so if we care 
about lifetime well-being.6 
  
- Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, among others, have argued against using 
non-tax instruments for redistributive purposes. The core of the analysis is this:  
Whenever the policymaker rejects a policy which has certain “efficiency” 
characteristics, on distributive grounds, it will be possible to couple the efficient 
policy with changes to the income tax system so that everyone is better off.   But 
what, exactly, does “efficiency” mean?  And how does uncertainty figure into the 
argument?   If one adopts a lifetime perspective together with an “ex post” 
account of choice under uncertainty, one policy is Pareto-superior to another -- 
the second would be rejected by any social welfare function -- only if the first 
policy increases everyone’s lifetime well-being in every state of the world.   Call 
this EP-L Pareto superiority. An “efficient” policy, in turn, is one that can be 
transformed into an EP-L Pareto superior policy via the tax system. This is a 
demanding criterion which, it seems, few real-world policies will satisfy. Thus, 
the Kaplow and Shavell argument turns out to have limited scope.   
 
-- The “suspect class” framework is a useful heuristic for evaluating distributional 
impacts.  A policy is distributionally problematic, and merits closer scrutiny, if it 
discriminates against, or has a disparate impact on, racial minorities, women, and 
perhaps other groups.   What groups precisely?  The specification of suspect 
classes implicates the time-slice problem -- because a suspect class is one whose 
members tend to be badly off, and one then needs to ask whether that means 
“badly off” in lifetime or sublifetime terms.   This implication is clearest in the 
case of age.  From the sublifetime perspective, there is a strong case for thinking 
of the aged as a suspect class.  Older individuals tend to have poorer health, lower 
incomes, fewer friends and pursuits, and so forth.  From the lifetime perspective, 
that case evaporates or at least becomes much weaker.  Absent secular changes in 
individuals’ income, health, etc., the distribution of lifetime well-being among 
individuals who have reached a point of relatively advanced age (e.g., 85) should 
be no different from the distribution of lifetime well-being among individuals 
who are now younger but will live to that point.  And older individuals will tend 
                                                 
6 See infra Part IV.B. 
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to have a higher level of lifetime well-being than younger individuals who will 
die prematurely, before ever reaching that age.  
  
In short, a wide range of real-world questions that egalitarians should care about -- 
questions about how to measure inequality and how to design policies to redress it -- are 
enmeshed with the time-slice problem. It is surprising -- deeply puzzling, really -- that 
legal scholars have paid the problem so little attention.   
 
I. EQUITY-REGARDING WELFARISM 
 
 This Part sets forth the welfarist account of equality that undergirds the remainder 
of the Article.  Section A explains what a “social welfare” function (SWF) is, and 
distinguishes between three different kinds of equity-regarding SWFs: “prioritarian,” 
“comparativist,” and “sufficientist.”   Section B explicates the distinction between 
lifetime and sublifetime views, within the SWF framework.   Section C addresses the 
worry that welfarism and the SWF framework is an inadequate basis for thinking about 
problems of equality. 
 
 A. Social Welfare Functions (SWFs) 
 
 The SWF framework, which is little used by philosophers but is standard within 
theoretical welfare economics and certain areas of applied economics and legal 
scholarship, works as follows.7  Assume a fixed population of N individuals, each of 
whom lives for K periods.8  Each possible outcome is represented by a vector or list of 
utilities, representing the lifetime or sublifetime well-being of the individuals in that 
outcome.  In the case of lifetime welfarism, each possible outcome will be represented as 
a vector of N utilities (1 for each lifetime well-being of each of the N individuals). In the 
case of sublifetime welfarism, each possible outcome will be represented as a vector of 
N×K utilities (1 for the well-being of each of the N individuals during each of the K 
stages in her life.)   However, let us ignore the distinction between lifetime and 
sublifetime utilities for the moment.   On both sorts of views, each outcome is 
representable as a vector, with an appropriate number of entries, representing individuals’ 
well-being.  To put this formally, there is a utility function u that maps a given outcome 
O onto a vector u(O), with N or N×K entries. 
 
 An SWF is a mathematical function w which takes the utility vector for each 
outcome, and maps it onto a single (scalar) number, representing the social value of that 
                                                 
7 See generally Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and 
Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 291-304 (2006). 
8The “fixed population” assumption means that the same individuals exist in all possible outcomes of the 
policy choices on hand.  A full theory of social choice will indeed need to deal with variable-population 
cases, where the composition of the population may vary across outcomes.   On the specific issue of the 
time slice, however, it is very hard to see why a shift from fixed- to variable population cases should shift 
the relevant time slice from sublifetime to lifetime utilities.  In any event, and in order to simply the 
analysis, I will not discuss variable-population issues here.  On such issues, see generally CHARLES 
BLACKORBY ET AL., POPULATION ISSUES IN SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, WELFARE ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS 
(2005). 
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outcome.  w(u(O))>w(u(O*)) if and only if O is a better outcome than O*, where w is the 
SWF and u(O) and u(O*) are the utility vectors representing outcomes O and O*, 
respectively. 
 
    THE SWF FRAMEWORK    
 
 
 
   
 An SWF can be thought of as a mathematical representation of a welfarist moral 
view.  A welfarist view offers moral verdicts of a certain sort: verdicts about how well off 
different individuals are in different outcomes; and verdicts about how outcomes 
compare with each other, which depend solely on the verdicts about individual well-
being.  (This is what makes the view welfarist: its ranking of outcomes and, then, 
choices, must be a product solely of well-being information.)  The SWF framework 
formalizes all this with numbers. 
 
 A more precise statement of the correspondence between welfarist moral views 
and SWFs is this:  A given welfarist moral view corresponds to a set of pairs of utility 
functions and social welfare function, {(u1, w1), (u2, w2), … (uL, wL)}, where each ui maps 
a given outcome onto a vector of N or N× K utilities, and each wi then maps utility 
vectors onto scalars representing the social value of outcomes.  The reasons for thinking 
of a welfarist moral view as represented by a set of pairs of utility functions and SWFs, 
rather than a single such pair, have to do with the nonuniqueness of utility numbers and 
the possibility of incommensurability.9  These issues are orthogonal to the time-slice 
                                                 
9 Social choice theorists typically associate a single SWF with a family of utility functions, recognizing that 
the given SWF applied to the original utility function or admissible transformations thereof will produce 
the same ordering of outcomes. For example, the utilitarian SWF, applied to utility vectors produced from 
outcomes using a given u, will produce the same ordering of outcomes if u is multiplied by any positive 
constant and any constant is added.  The sum of the square root of utilities, a kind of equity-regarding 
SWF, will produce the same ordering of outcomes if u is multiplied by a positive constant.  
My suggestion that a given welfarist moral view might correspond to a set of SWFs (each paired 
with a corresponding utility function), rather than a single SWF, is a natural extension of the basic idea that 
utility functions and SWFs are mathematical representations of a moral view and that such representations 
Outcome 
O 
 
Vector of utilities 
 (u1,…,uM),  
where M=N 
(lifetime welfarism) 
or  
M=N×K 
(sublifetime 
welfarism)
Social value= 
w(u1,…,uM) 
Utility 
function 
u(O) 
Social welfare  
function 
w(u(O)) 
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problem, however, and the arguments below in favor of a lifetime view will generally 
adopt the simplifying assumption that moral views correspond to a single utility function 
and social welfare function.  
 
 For a welfarist moral view to provide useful guidance to decisionmakers, it must 
do more than rank outcomes.  It must also rank choices, in a given choice situation, as a 
function of the possible outcomes of each choice.  This is the problem of outfitting an 
SWF for choice under uncertainty, which will be postponed until Part III. 
 
 What, exactly, are “outcomes”?   In the case of unboundedly rational 
decisionmakers – decisionmakers who may not be omniscient but have unbounded 
reasoning abilities and mental storage capacities --- each outcome is what philosophers 
call a “possible world”: a fully specified possible history of the universe.   No humans are 
unboundedly rational.  SWFs with possible worlds as outcomes would be unusable by 
humans.  Rather, SWFs must operate on simplified possible worlds: simplified pictures of 
possible realities.  How to identify the appropriate simplification is a huge, unsolved 
problem for welfarism, and consequentialism more generally, which I will not attempt to 
address here.  The problem is orthogonal to the time-slice problem and does not, I think, 
affect my argument for the lifetime view or assessment of its legal implications. 
 
 So the SWF framework maps outcomes – simplified possible worlds – onto 
vectors of utilities, and then uses an SWF to map these vectors onto numbers representing 
the ranking of the outcomes.   Economists virtually always make the further assumption 
that SWFs satisfy the Pareto principle for outcomes, and most philosophers (even those 
who care about equality) find that principle congenial.  The Pareto principle for outcomes 
says that, if at least one individual is better off in one outcome as compared to a second, 
and no individual is worse off, the first outcome must be ranked higher.  For the 
remainder of the Article, the reader should understand (unless otherwise noted) that all 
SWFs being discussed satisfy the Pareto principle for outcomes.10  
   
 What, then, is the distinction (within the family of SWFs satisfying the Pareto 
principle for outcomes) between SWFs which are sensitive to distributional 
considerations -- for short, “equity-regarding” SWFs – and SWFs which are not? 
 
 Economists have a simple answer. An SWF is equity-regarding if it satisfies the 
so-called Pigou-Dalton axiom.11  The Pigou-Dalton axiom says that a transfer of a unit of 
utility from a higher utility individual to a lower utility individual, holding constant total 
utility, must increase social value.  Note that the utilitarian SWF, which simply sums 
                                                                                                                                                 
may not be unique.  Further, that extension may be helpful in allowing the SWF framework to cope with 
incommensurability -- where a moral view provides a partial rather than complete ordering of outcomes.  
The view corresponds to {(u1, w1), (u2, w2), … (uL, wL)}; each pair (ui,wi) provides a complete ordering of 
outcomes; the partial ordering is the “intersection” of these complete orderings, i.e., one outcome is better 
than another pursuant to the view iff  it is better according to every (ui,wi) pair.   
10 See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 7, at 293-94. All SWFs also satisfy an anonymity constraint, id., 
which is even less controversial.  Two vectors with the same utilities, but in a different order, must be 
ranked the same. 
11 See Adler & Sanchrico, supra note 7, at 298-300. 
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utilities, and is the hallmark of an SWF that is not equity-regarding, does not satisfy the 
Pigou-Dalton axiom. 
 
   THE PIGOU-DALTON PRINCIPLE 
 
 
      
 How does this simple answer relate to the contemporary philosophical literature, 
which has coalesced around three different conceptions of equality: a view commonly 
known as “prioritarian,” a view which I shall term “comparativist,” and a view 
commonly known as “sufficientist”?   
 
 “Prioritarians” do not essentially care about the pattern of well-being.12  Rather, 
they give greater social value to increments to well-being that are realized by individuals 
at lower levels of well-being.   They believe that individuals who are worse off in 
absolute terms have a stronger moral claim. There is a standard and intuitively 
compelling way to represent “prioritarianism” in the SWF framework: namely, a 
prioritarian SWF is one that sums an increasing, strictly concave function g of individual 
utilities. Assume we have a vector u(O) with M entries (where M=N in the case of 
lifetime welfarism, and M=N×K in the case of sublifetime welfarism).  In other words, 
u(O) = (u1, u2, …, uM), where u1 is the first utility number in the vector, u2 the second, up 
to uM. Then a prioritarian SWF w has the following form: 
1
( ( )) ( )
M
j
j
w u O g u
=
= ∑ , where g is 
an increasing, strictly concave function. 
  
An increasing, strictly concave g-function, such as the square root or the 
logarithm, has a positive first derivative and a negative second derivative.13  This means 
                                                 
12 See id. at 300-01. 
13 This is imprecise, because strictly concave functions need not be fully differentiable.  A precise 
definition is that a strictly concave function g is such that the weighted average of the g-value of any two 
(1, 5, 10, 15)=initial utility vector 
Transfer units of utility (here,2) from a 
higher utility level (10) to a lower utility 
level (5), keeping total utility constant 
(1, 7, 8, 15)=new utility vector  
The Pigou-Dalton principle requires that 
this change increase social welfare, i.e., 
w(1,7,8,15)>w(1,5,10,15). 
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(1) that an increase in some individual’s utility, ceteris paribus, increases the value of the 
SWF, that is, 
1
( )
M
j
j
g u
=
∑ , which is just what the Pareto principle for outcomes says; and (2) 
that the increase in the value of the SWF produced by a small increase in an individual’s 
utility (the first derivative of g) decreases as the level of that utility increases , which is 
just a mathematical restatement of the prioritarian idea that changes in an individual’s 
well-being have greater moral importance the lower the level of  the individual’s well-
being. 
 
 Any SWF which takes the form of summing an increasing, strictly concave 
function of individual utilities will satisfy the Pigou-Dalton axiom.  Note, further, that 
any SWF which takes the form of summing an increasing, strictly concave function of 
individual utilities will satisfy an “indifference” axiom.  This says that the ranking of two 
utility vectors should be unaffected by “indifferent” utilities: those that are the same in 
the two vectors.  “Indifference” is a precise and, once more, intuitively attractive way to 
express the notion that prioritarians do not essentially care about the pattern of welfare 
levels. 
 
  
    THE INDIFFERENCE AXIOM  
 
 
  
      
 In the case of prioritarianism, then, the translation into SWF language is pretty 
straightforward.  Things get a bit trickier when we turn to “comparativism.”  
“Comparativists” do care essentially about patterns.  To put this formally, a 
“comparativist” SWF does not satisfy the indifference axiom.  But we need to say more, 
                                                                                                                                                 
numbers is less than the g value of their weighted average, for all weights.  See, e.g., RANGARAJAN K. 
SUNDARAN, A FIRST COURSE IN OPTIMIZATION THEORY 173-85 (1996). 
Consider the initial pair of utility vectors 
(a,b,x,y,c,d), (a*,b*,x,y,c*,d*), with the same 
utilities in the 3rd and 4th positions.   Change those 
“indifferent” utilities to produce a new pair of 
utility vectors (a,b,x+,y+,c,d), (a*,b*,x+,y+, 
c*,d*).  The “indifference” axiom says that 
w(a,b,x,y,c,d)>w(a*,b*,x,y,c*,d*) if and only if 
w(a,b,x+,y+,c,d)>w(a*,b*,x+,y+,c*,d*) 
For example, if the social value of (2,10,100,100,3,5) is 
greater than that of (4,4,100,100,4,4), then the social value 
of (2,10,4,4,3,5) must be greater than that of (4,4,4,4,4,4). 
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because there are lots of SWFs which fail indifference but we would surely not want to 
describe as equity-regarding.  The simple answer is that a comparativist SWF is one that 
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton axiom (and thus is equity-regarding), but fails indifference 
(and in that sense essentially cares about patterns).14  This is rough, because there are 
comparativists who think that the Pigou-Dalton axiom is too demanding.15  Once we 
depart from prioritarianism and start to care about patterns, why insist that every Pigou-
Dalton transfer must be an improvement in the pattern?  A somewhat better definition is 
that a comparativist SWF fails indifference and counts a total-utility-preserving move to 
perfect equality as an improvement.  This may be too weak, but seems closer to the 
truth,16 and shall be the definition I use here.17     
    
   COMPARATIVIST SWFs   
 
 
   
 
 “Sufficientists,” like prioritarians, deny that the pattern of well-being is itself of 
moral significance.18   Rather, a concern for “equity” arises in virtue of the fact that 
individuals who are worse off in absolute terms have a stronger moral claim.  But, unlike 
prioritarians, they believe that this claim evaporates once the individuals reach a level of 
“sufficient” or “adequate” well-being.   In other words, “sufficientists” incorporate a 
                                                 
14 See id. at 300-02. 
15 See id. at 303; LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 83-84 (1993). 
16It is plausible that an SWF which generally ranks outcomes in light of total utility, but gives  a bonus to 
outcomes where all the utilities are exactly equal, should be counted as equity-regarding. 
17 Note that, if an SWF counts every Pigou-Dalton transfer as an improvement (the stronger definition), 
then it counts a move to total equality as an improvement (the weaker definition), because a move to 
equality can be achieved by a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers. See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 7, at 299 
n.40. 
18 See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745 (2003); Harry Frankfurt, Equality 
as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21 (1987). 
An SWF that fails Indifference but satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle: the sum 
of rank-weighted utilities.  If (a,b,c,d) are utilities in ascending order, then 
w=4a+3b+2c+d .  The Pigou-Dalton principle is satisfied: w(1,3,7,12)=39, and if 
we transfer 2 units from the fourth to the third entry, producing (1,3,9,10), 
w(1,3,9,10)=41.  However, the Indifference Axiom is not satisfied.  While 
w(5,10,12,16)<w(6,10,12,13), w(5,1,2,16)>w(6,1,2,13). 
An SWF that fails Indifference and Pigou-Dalton but prefers perfect 
equalization:  An SWF that sums utilities, but adds some premium k to the 
sum if the utilities are perfectly equal.  Note how this fails Pigou-Dalton. 
w(1,3,7,12)=23, and w(1,3,9,10)=23.   Note also that it fails Indifference. 
For example, if k is 6, then while 
w(2,10,100,100)>w(4,4,100,100),w(2,10,4,4)<w(4,4,4,4).
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morally critical threshold level of well-being into their theory.  Those below the threshold 
have stronger moral claims to welfare than those above.   Those above the threshold do 
not have stronger claims than those yet further above.   To put this in SWF terms, 
“sufficientists” (like prioritarians) accept the indifference axiom but accept the Pigou-
Dalton axiom only with respect to transfers across the threshold, and not with respect to 
transfers between individuals above it. For example, imagine that the utility threshold is 
20.  Then a sufficientist SWF w will say that w(1,5,25,35)=w(1,5,27,33) -- despite the 
transfer of 2 units from the fourth to the third entry -- but that w(1,5,25,35)<w(1,7,23,35). 
 
 The following table summarizes the features of the three families of equity-
regarding SWFs, as just explicated.  
 
 
    SWFs: A SUMMARY 
 
-- The Utilitarian SWF (simple sum of utilities) 
 
-- Equity Regarding SWFs 
-- Prioritarian SWFs: w(u1,u2,…,uM)= 
1
( )
M
j
j
g u
=
∑ , where g is increasing and strictly concave 
 Prioritarian SWFs satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle and the Indifference axiom. 
  
 -- Comparativist SWFs:  These do not satisfy the Indifference axiom.  However, they do either (1) 
satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle, or if not (2) at least count perfect equalization of utilities, 
holding total utility constant, as an improvement.   
  
-- Sufficientist SWFs: These incorporate a well-being threshold, and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton 
principle with respect to transfers across the threshold, but not with respect to transfers above it. 
They do satisfy the Indifference axiom. 
 
 A final point of clarification.  Prioritarian, comparativist, and sufficientist SWFs 
are equity-regarding, in the sense that they care about the distribution of well-being (more 
precisely, in satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle, generally or across a threshold, or at 
least preferring perfect equalization). But they are also sensitive to considerations other 
then equity.  If we add an increment to the largest utility in the vector, then that cannot be 
an improvement with respect to equality, but still (given the Pareto principle for 
outcomes) must be counted as a social improvement.  To put the point another way, 
prioritarian, comparativist, and sufficientist SWFs represent all-things-considered moral 
judgments, integrating both considerations of distribution and considerations of Pareto 
efficiency or overall well-being.  No one who accepts the Pareto principle for outcomes 
believes that our all-things-considered moral judgments are solely a matter of equity.  
 
 B. Lifetime versus Sublifetime Views 
 
 The difference between lifetime and sublifetime equity-regarding views can now 
be stated.  I will assume that each outcome can be described as a series of temporally 
locatable facts – facts that occur in arbitrarily small periods.  (Because the facts of 
relevance to welfare either consist of, or supervene upon, physical or mental facts 
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somewhere in the world, this assumption seems plausible.)    There are N individuals in 
the population.  The lifetime equity-regarding view represents a given outcome as a 
vector of N utilities, representing the lifetime well-being of each individual in that 
outcome, where each utility is a function of all the facts about that outcome; and applies 
some equity-regarding SWF (prioritarian, comparativist, or sufficientist) to that N-entry 
vector.    The sublifetime equity-regarding view cares about the distribution of individual 
well-being during some temporal fraction of a lifetime.  It divides the outcome into K 
stages (these could be decades, years, months, or moments); represents the well-being of 
each individual in a given stage with a stage utility number which is a function of all the 
facts in that stage; and applies some equity-regarding SWF (prioritarian, comparativist, 
sufficientist) to the N×K entry vector that results. 
 
 To put this a bit more formally, if OF  are all the facts about outcome O, then 
1 2( , ,..., )
O O O O
KF F F F= , where 1OF  are all the facts about outcome O in period 1, 2OF  
are the facts about outcome O in period 2, up to OKF , the facts about outcome O in period 
K.   In the case of lifetime welfarism, u(O), the utility vector for outcome O, has N entries 
(u1, u2, … ,uN), where ui is the lifetime utility of individual i.  Each lifetime utility number 
ui is a function of -- potentially influenced by -- the facts about the outcome in all 
periods, that is by the whole array 1 2( , ,..., )
O O O
KF F F .  In the case of sublifetime welfarism, 
u(O), the utility vector for outcome O has N×K entries 
1,1 2,1 ,1 1,2 2,2 ,2 1, 2, ,( , ,..., ; , ,..., ;...; , ,..., )N N K K N Ku u u u u u u u u , where u1,1 is the utility of individual 
1 during period 1, u1,2 the utility of individual 1 during period 2, and so forth, up to ,N Ku , 
the utility of the last individual N during the last period K.   Each ,i ku  is a function of the 
contemporaneous facts, the facts in period k, that is OkF .  So sublifetime utilities u1,1, u2,1, 
up to uN,1 are a function of 1
OF ; sublifetime utilities u1,2, u2,2, up to uN,2 are a function of 
2
OF ; and so forth. 
 
 Note some critical points about this conceptualization of the lifetime/sublifetime 
distinction. First, I assume that a given individual’s sublifetime well-being during some 
period is a function solely of the facts during that period. The proponents of sublifetime 
accounts seem to adopt this premise implicitly,19 and it is intuitively plausible.  How well 
Sam’s life is going during a year depends on what happens during that year, and is not 
dependent on what happens to him later on, or what happened to him earlier. 
  
 Second, I do not assume that a given individual’s lifetime or sublifetime well-
being depends just on facts about his own mental states or physical body. As discussed in 
a moment, the SWF framework is meant to mesh with a wide variety of conceptions of 
                                                 
19 As further discussed below, in Part II, McKerlie presents cases in which we (allegedly) prefer to equalize 
sublifetime well-being, such as the noble-peasant case.  These are cases in which the difference in 
sublifetime well-being during some period supervenes on facts in that period -- for example, facts about 
who is a noble and who a peasant at a particular point in time.  He and Parfit also discuss our preference to 
relieve temporary suffering -- the idea, here, is that a person is particularly badly off at a given time 
because she is suffering at that time.  
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well-being.  An individual’s well-being during a period, or over his lifetime, may depend 
on what other individuals are doing or thinking (for example, on how well his children 
are doing, or what his social status is), or other facts about the world outside his mind and 
body. 
 
 Finally, I do not assume that an individual’s lifetime utility is additively separable  
into the sum of some function of sublifetime utilities (either the straight sum of 
sublifetime utilities, or the sum of some transformation thereof).20  Although economists 
sometimes assume additive separability, it is an oversimplification – and, for our 
purposes, a problematic one.  Additive separability rules out the possibility of cross-
temporal interaction effects, between welfare-relevant facts in different periods, in 
producing lifetime well-being. For example, it rules out the possibility of an improvement 
effect -- namely that a life where facts with respect to some aspect of well-being get 
better over time is better just by virtue of this improvement. There is strong experimental 
support for an improvement effect, and for other failures of additive separability, and 
there is no reason to think that the best theory of lifetime well-being satisfies additive 
separability.21  
                                                 
20 Formally, additive separability says that ui, the lifetime utility of individual i, can be decomposed as 
follows:  ,1 ,2 ,( ) ( ) ... ( )i i i i Ku v u v u v u= + + + , where v is some function and ui,k is the sublifetime utility 
of individual i during period k. 
 
21The issues, here, involve what might be called an “independence” condition with respect to the 
relationship between temporal facts and lifetime well-being.  (This is structurally very similar to the 
“indifference” principle discussed earlier, although that principle involved the connection between utilities 
and social welfare, while this one involves the connection between sublifetime facts in one individual’s life 
and his lifetime well-being.)  The independence condition says the following.  Consider two arrays of facts 
in periods 1 through K, with identical facts in one or more periods.   Produce two new arrays of facts, by 
taking the periodic facts that are the same in both arrays and substituting any other pair of identical periodic 
facts. Then the ordering of the arrays must be preserved. If the original two arrays produced equal lifetime 
utility for individual i, then the two new arrays must do so.  Similarly, if one of the two arrays produced 
greater lifetime utility for individual i, then the new array created from this one must produce greater 
lifetime utility than the new array created from the other array.  To illustrate, if (A,B,W,X,C) and 
(A*,B*,W,X,C*) are two arrays of facts (in a 5-period case), then the temporal facts are identical in periods 
3 and 4 across the arrays.  We produce two new arrays by substituting new facts: Y for W and Z for X.  So 
we now have two new arrays (A,B,Y,Z,C) and (A*,B*,Y,Z,C*).  If (A,B,W,X,C) produces a higher 
lifetime utility for i than (A*,B*,W,X,C*), then  (A,B,Y,Z,C) must produce a higher lifetime utility than 
(A*,B*,Y,Z,C*).  And if (A,B,W,X,C) produces the same lifetime utility as (A*,B*,W,X,C*), then  
(A,B,Y,Z,C) must produce the same lifetime utility as (A*,B*,Y,Z,C*).   
It is easy to see that additive separability implies that the “independence” condition is satisfied.  
Remember that each sublifetime utility for individual i (that is, each ui,k,, where k ranges from 1 to K) is just 
a function of the facts in period k.   On the independence condition and additive separability, see, e.g., Han 
Bleichrodt & Amiram Gafni, Time Preference, The Discounted Utility Model, and Health, 15 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 51-53, 55; Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in 
TIME AND DECISION 13, 21 (George Loewenstein et al., 2003) 
 The “independence” condition, in turn, precludes an improvement effect. For example, if we are 
inclined to say that steadily improving sequences of mental states such as (unhappy, neutral, happy) are 
better for well-being as such, we will violate the “independence” condition.  We will say that (unhappy, 
neutral, happy) is better than (unhappy, happy, neutral), but that (happy, neutral, happy) and (happy, happy, 
neutral) are equally good, which violates “independence.”  For philosophical argument in favor of an 
improvement effect, see J. David Velleman, Well-Being and Time, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 329, 
331 (John Martin Fischer ed., 1993). This argument is buttressed by empirical work.  “One of the most 
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 Indeed, I do not assume that lifetime utility is a function of sublifetime utility  at 
all.  Someone’s lifetime well-being in an outcome depends on everything that happens in 
that outcome, in turn parsable into everything that happens during each period; but it is a 
further, and contestable, assumption that the rich information about temporal facts in each 
period can be compressed into a single utility number, with lifetime well-being in turn a 
function of the utility number in each period.  There is no reason to saddle the lifetime 
view with that assumption either. 
 
 C. Why Welfarism? 
   
 The SWF framework is, I believe, an attractive framework for thinking about 
policy problems.  As already mentioned, the framework is agnostic about the nature of 
well-being.  It can be meshed with objectivist accounts, preferentialist accounts, or 
mental state accounts (the three leading families of views about well-being), or indeed 
with any other account.22  For any moral view, whatever its account of well-being, an 
individual’s lifetime or sublifetime utility represents her lifetime or sublifetime 
attainment with respect to that.    
 
 Further, as should now be abundantly clear, SWFs are potentially sensitive to 
equity considerations.  Utilitarianism is simply one variant of welfarism.  Finally, the use 
of a formal, mathematical vocabulary helps sharpen important distinctions relevant to 
discussions of equality – for example, what prioritarianism means, what cross-temporal 
interaction effects are, or (as we shall see in Part III) what the different conceptions of 
choice under uncertainty involve. 
 
 Still, the reader might object to the framework. She might object, first, that the 
precision mathematical representation imports is purchased at a cost – the cost of 
ignoring incommensurability.   The framework tries to represent a moral view’s verdict 
                                                                                                                                                 
robust findings in research about assessment of experiences is the clear preference for improvement over 
time.  … Preference for improvement has been demonstrated in many domains, including monetary 
payments, experiences such as vacations, queuing events, pain, discomfort, medical outcomes and 
treatments, gambling, and academic performance.”  Dan Ariely & Ziv Carmon, Summary Assessments of 
Experiences: The Whole is Different from the Sum of its Parts, in TIME AND DECISION, supra, at 323, 327 
(citations omitted).  See also Frederick, supra, at 28-29; George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Preferences 
for Sequences of Outcomes, 100 PSYCH. REV. 91 92-93 (1993). Other empirical findings inconsistent with 
the “independence” condition include a preference to spread rather than cluster enjoyable preferences: 
“maximal endurable time” preferences with respect to health states; and the “peak-end” rule for 
retrospective evaluations of experiential sequences.  See Frederick, supra, at 29-30; Aki Tsuchiya & Paul 
Dolan, The QALY Model and Individual Preferences for Health States and Health Profiles over Time: A 
Systematic Review of the Literature, 25 MED. DECISION MAKING 460, 461 (2005); Ariely & Carmon, supra, 
at  326-27 
To be sure, the question how the temporal components of well-being produce lifetime well-being 
is normative, not empirical.  The welfarist is not obliged to incorporate all of the observed violations of the 
“independence” condition into her account of lifetime well-being.  (For example, she might see “peak-end” 
evaluations as a kind of irrationality.)  But I suggest that many plausible accounts of lifetime well-being 
will violate the “independence” condition in some way. 
22 For a discussion of these various accounts, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW 
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 28-35 (2006). 
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with respect to the ordering of outcomes by an SWF.  But, in fact, there are plausible 
moral views which incompletely order outcomes – which include pairs of outcomes such 
that neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good – and no such ordering can 
be represented by a single SWF operating on a single utility vector for each outcome.23   I 
have already suggested, however, that the problem of incommensurability can be handled 
by conceptualizing a given welfarist moral view as corresponding to a set of pairs of 
utility functions and SWFs, rather than a single pair.24  
   
 A second and quite different objection is that the SWF framework ignores 
considerations of choice and responsibility.  In ranking outcomes, we should be sensitive 
to information about the causal origins of individuals’ well-being attainments, and not 
simply to those attainments.  Did individuals end up where they did because of “brute 
luck,” or because of the foreseeable result of their own choices?  Dworkin, Sen, and other 
prominent philosophers have challenged welfarist accounts of equality on these 
grounds.25 The difficulty is that no one has yet provided a general framework for 
integrating considerations of overall well-being and the distribution of well-being (which 
the SWF framework accomplishes) with information about individual choice and 
responsibility.  This is an active area of research, where attractive solutions may well 
emerge, but for now the question of how a responsibility-sensitive welfarist would 
analyze the time-slice problem is not one I can address. 
 
II. LIFETIME VERSUS SUBLIFETIME VIEWS: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 
  
 Having explicated the SWF framework and the conceptual difference between 
lifetime and sublifetime views, I now turn to substantive philosophical analysis.  Section 
A presents the basic case for lifetime welfarism.  Sections B and C address two important 
responses to that case: one, by Dennis McKerlie, which adopts a standard picture of 
personal identity over time; and a second, by Derek Parfit, which trades on a deflationary 
view of personal identity.  
 
 A. The Basic Case for the Lifetime View  
   
 A number of prominent philosophers of equality have adopted a lifetime view.  
This includes Thomas Nagel, who writes: “the subject of an egalitarian principle is not 
the distribution of particular rewards to individuals at some time, but the prospective 
quality of their lives as a whole, from birth to death ….”26   It also includes John Rawls 
and Ronald Dworkin, who believe that distributive justice requires a fair allocation of 
lifetime shares of “primary goods” or “resources.”27   The philosophers Norman Daniels 
and Dan Brock, who have theorized about the distribution of health care, have also 
                                                 
23 An SWF assigns a single real number to each utility vector. Every real number is greater than, less than, 
or precisely equal to every other real number.  
24 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
25 See Arneson, supra note 2. 
26 THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 69 (1991). See also THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 
120, 124 n.16 (1979).  
27See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78,178 (1971); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: 
Equality of Resources, 10 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 283, 304-05 (1981). 
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argued for the lifetime perspective, as has Alan Williams, a leading health economist.28  
To quote Brock:  
 
 People’s lives extend continuously over time, and our moral concern should be for the lives they 
lead, not simply for how good their lives are at a particular point in time, whether now or 
sometime in the past or the future.  A concern for the worse off should reflect this concern for 
people’s lives as a whole and so not ignore the duration of people’s poor health. Moreover, in 
other areas besides health we often take what a person has had or suffered in the past to be 
relevant in distributing scarce benefits now; if one child has had little opportunity for travel in the 
past in comparison with her well-traveled sibling, fairness supports giving a travel opportunity to 
her now that can only go to one of them ….29 
 
 The basic argument in favor of a lifetime view is straightforward.  I will articulate 
this argument in terms of well-being, because (again) the framework for this Article is 
welfarist.  Egalitarian considerations enter morality because it is important to treat 
separate persons fairly.30  It is unfair that some individuals end up with more well-being 
than others, at least where the worse-off individuals are not responsible for their plight.   
Another way to put the same idea is this:  individuals are moral equals; as equals, 
individuals have equal claims to flourish, to have good lives; and therefore a distribution 
of well-being that departs from equality is prima facie problematic.  Such a distribution 
may be justified, all-things-considered – for example, a Pareto-superior move away from 
perfect equality will be justified, all-things-considered – but it has the troubling feature 
that some individuals’ claims to well-being are more fully satisfied than others’. 
  
 On this picture of the moral force of equality, well-being is a quantifiable 
characteristic of each person in each outcome.  Call it “property W”.  Individuals have 
equal claims to property W; and the unequal distribution of property W is, prima facie, 
morally problematic. 
 
 Let us adopt, now, a traditional premise about personal identity: namely,  that 
each human is a single person, from birth to death.  The upshot is that individuals or 
persons endure over time.  A single person has multiple temporal stages.  What, then, is 
property W?  We cannot say that property W is the individual’s sublifetime well-being, 
full stop – because (on the assumption of multiple temporal stages) there are multiple 
sublifetime well-being properties associated with each person.  We might adopt the view 
                                                 
28 See Dan W. Brock, Priority to the Worst Off in Health-Care Resource Prioritization, in MEDICINE AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 362, 370 (Rosamond Rhodes et al. eds., 2002); NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND 
JUSTIFICATION 257-83 (1996); NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS’ KEEPER (1988); NORMAN DANIELS, 
JUST HEALTH CARE 86-113 (1985); Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the “Fair 
Innings” Argument, 6 HEALTH ECON. 117 (1997). 
29 Brock, supra note 28, at 370. 
30 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have emphasized the distinction between “fairness” and “welfarism,” 
so it may seem oxymoronic for the equity-regarding welfarist to appeal to fairness considerations.  See 
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). But a view which understands 
well-being itself as the “currency” of distributive justice, and explains the weight of distributional 
considerations by pointing out the unfairness of giving some individuals more than others, is fully welfarist 
in the standard sense and indeed in Kaplow and Shavell’s.  Such a view satisfies the supervenience 
requirement definitional of welfarism: no outcome is ranked better than another unless there is some well-
being difference between the outcomes.  
 17
that property W is each individual’s sublifetime well-being during some stipulated stage 
(say, the last year of her life, or the first year, or the middle year).   But picking one stage 
over another as the stipulated stage seems arbitrary.  How the individual does during the 
stipulated stage is no more a property of that individual, and no more a well-being 
property, than how she does during any other stage.   
 
  Further, for any stipulated stage, we can imagine lowering some person P’s well-
being during that stage, with a compensating increase in a different stage, so that her 
lifetime well-being remains the same.  It would be odd to think that this shift, without 
more, could change our assessment of the fairness of the distribution of well-being as 
between P and other individuals.  The extent to which P’s claim to well-being is satisfied, 
and to which other individuals’ claims to well-being are satisfied, seem to be unchanged 
by the shift.  P has been (seemingly) compensated for the loss in well-being during the 
stipulated stage by an increase in well-being at another time.  But, if property W is well-
being during the stipulated stage, this temporal shift in P’s well-being – without more – 
could  affect our assessment of the fairness of distribution of well-being as between P and 
other individuals.  
  
 Here’s another way to make this last point.  If individuals endure over time, then 
– as a matter of honoring individuals’ claims to well-being – it should always or at least 
often be possible to compensate an individual for a loss of well-being during one period 
with a gain during another.   Call this “the possibility of intrapersonal, intertemporal 
compensation.” (PIIC). But, in turn, PIIC will undercut the identification of property W 
with an individual’s sublifetime well-being during any stipulated stage.  With PIIC in 
hand, we can always construct cases in which a change in individuals’ well-being during 
the stipulated stage, with compensating changes later or earlier in their lives, produces no 
true change in how equally well-being is distributed across persons , but would be 
recorded as changing that distribution by a sublifetime view focused on the stipulated 
stage.  As Nagel explains: 
 
 [The possibility of intrapersonal compensation] implies … that if an egalitarian theory is accepted, 
it should apply only across lives rather than within them.  It is a reason for taking individual 
human lives, rather than individual experiences, as the units over which any distributive principle 
should operate.31 
  
The upshot is that property W is lifetime well-being.  Given the persistence of individual 
identity over time, it seems hard to reject PIIC; and PIIC, in turn, means that the well-
being characteristic whose fair distribution equality requires cannot be well-being during 
any stipulated sublifetime stage.   
  
 Thus the basic case for a lifetime account.  We shall now consider two arguments 
for a sublifetime view: one, principally advanced by Dennis McKerlie, which does not 
make revisionary claims about personal identity over time; and another, advanced by 
Derek Parfit, which does. 
 
                                                 
31 NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS, supra note 26, at 120. 
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 B.  McKerlie’s Response 
 
 In a series of articles, Dennis McKerlie has argued for the moral relevance of 
sublifetime well-being without challenging the standard view that each human is one and 
the same person from birth until death.32  In the early articles, McKerlie adopts what 
might be seen as a kind of sublifetime comparativism.  In the more recent work, 
McKerlie has shifted to a sublifetime prioritarianism. I shall consider both of these 
arguments, as well as a third issue – which McKerlie doesn’t raise – concerning the 
consistency of the lifetime view and sufficientism. 
 
 1.  Intuitions about Simultaneous Sublifetime Inequalities: A Sublifetime 
Comparativism? 
  
 In the early work, McKerlie appeals to our intuitions about synchronizing certain 
sublifetime sources of well-being across persons which, allegedly, show that we prefer to 
equalize sublifetime well-being even when lifetime well-being is held constant.33   He 
provides the following sort of example.  
 
 [Imagine a society] that contains great inequality, with happier lives attached to certain 
social positions.  But at a fixed time people change places and switch from a superior position to 
an inferior one or vice versa.  One example would be a feudal society in which peasants or nobles 
exchange roles every ten years.   The result is that people’s lives as wholes are equally happy. 
Nevertheless during a given time period the society contains great inequality …. If equality 
between complete lives were all that mattered, an egalitarian could not object to it.  But I think that 
many egalitarians would find it objectionable.34 
  
To give a modern example, as between two societies in which individuals sometimes 
have periodic incomes of $20,000, sometimes periodic incomes of $100,000, we prefer 
(ceteris paribus) the society in which everyone has the lower income at the same time.  
 
In other words, McKerlie suggests that we intuitively prefer outcome II to 
outcome I in the following sort of case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See Dennis McKerlie, Egalitarianism and the Difference Between Interpersonal and Intrapersonal 
Judgments, in EGALITARIANISM (Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2007);Dennis McKerlie, 
Justice Between the Young and the Old, 30 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 152 (2002); Dennis McKerlie, 
Dimensions of Equality, 13 UTILITAS 263 (2001);Dennis McKerlie, Equality Between Age-Groups, 21 
PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 275 (1992); Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Time, 99 ETHICS 475 (1989).. 
33 My analysis in this subsection is indebted to work by Klemens Kappel and R.I. Sikora, who provide a 
variety of criticisms of McKerlie’s sublifetime comparativism. See Klemens Kappel, Equality, Priority, 
and Time, 9 UTILITAS 203 (1997); R.I. Sikora, Six Viewpoints for Assessing Egalitarian Distributions 
Schemes, 99 ETHICS 492 (1989). 
34 McKerlie, Equality and Time,  supra note 32, at 479.  Larry Temkin offers a similar example.  See 
TEMKIN, supra note 15, at 235-38. 
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    Outcome I 
    Time Period 
   1  2  3  4  
 Person A Peasant  Noble  Peasant  Noble 
Person B Noble  Peasant  Noble  Peasant 
 
 
    Outcome II 
    Time Period 
   1  2  3  4   
 Person A Peasant  Noble  Peasant  Noble 
Person B Peasant  Noble  Peasant  Noble 
 
     
    OR    
       
    Outcome I 
    Time Period 
   1  2  3  4    
Person A $20,000  $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 
Person B $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 $20,000 
 
 
    Outcome II 
    Time Period 
   1  2  3  4    
Person A $20,000  $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 
Person B $20,000  $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 
 
 Let us grant McKerlie the intuition.  The question is how one explains it.  One 
could explain the intuition by assuming that being a peasant or having an income of 
$20,000 has a low context-invariant sublifetime utility (say, 2) and that being a noble or 
having an income of $100,000 has a high context-invariant sublifetime utility (say, 10).  
This is the picture McKerlie seems to be tendering.  In other words, McKerlie seems to 
be suggesting that the sublifetime and lifetime well-being attainments of the individuals 
in outcome I are accurately represented by the utility numbers in I*, and that the 
sublifetime and lifetime well-being attainments of the individuals in outcome II are 
accurately represented by the utility numbers in II*. 
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    I*  (Possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities   
    corresponding to Outcome I)  
           Lifetime  
    Time Period      Utility 
   1  2  3  4  
Person A 2  10  2  10  X 
Person B 10  2  10  2  X 
 
 
II* (Possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities  
Corresponding to Outcome II)  
           Lifetime 
    Time Period      Utility 
   1  2  3  4   
Person A 2  10  2  10  X  
Person B 2  10  2  10  X 
 
 
 Clearly, the lifetime view cannot explain a preference for II* over I*. Any SWF, 
applied to lifetime utilities, will rank the outcomes the same, because the vectors of 
lifetime utilities are identical. Note also that a sublifetime prioritarian view – a sum of an 
increasing, strictly concave function g of sublifetime utilities – cannot explain a 
preference for II* over I*.  Whatever the g-function, the sum of that function applied to 
the sublifetime utilities is the same in I* and II*.  However, there are equity-regarding 
SWFs, applied to sublifetime utilities, which would favor II* over I*.   In particular, a 
comparativist view that focused on the pattern of sublifetime utility within each time 
period could explain a preference for II* over I*.   Here’s a simple example: an SWF 
which aggregates sublifetime utilities, but gives an outcome a premium for every time 
period in which everyone’s sublifetime utility is exactly equal. 
 
 But why assume that outcomes I and II are accurately represented by I* and II*? 
The lifetime welfarist will see outcome I as an instance in which individual inequality in 
some time period with respect to some source of well-being – social status in the 
noble/peasant case, income in the $100,000/$20,000 case--– itself lowers lifetime well-
being.  In other words, it is worse for individual P to be a peasant during some portion of 
his life if other members of the society are nobles at the same time than to be a peasant 
during some portion of his life when everyone else in the society is also a peasant.  Being 
a peasant with nobles in the vicinity reduces P’s lifetime well-being because it is 
demoralizing, or frustrating, or lowers self-respect.  The impact on lifetime well-being of 
the status of peasant during some portion of a life is not context invariant.  Similarly, it is 
worse for P to have a life in which he has an income of $20,000 during some period when 
some members of the society have higher incomes during that period than to have that 
very same income during a period when everyone else has the same income. 
 
In short, the lifetime welfarist can see outcomes I and II as accurately represented 
by I+ and II+.   
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   I+  (Possible lifetime utilities      
   corresponding to Outcome I -- noble/peasant version)  
           Lifetime  
    Time Period      Utility 
   1  2  3  4  
Person A Peasant  Noble  Peasant  Noble  X 
Person B Noble  Peasant  Noble  Peasant  X 
 
 
II+ (Possible lifetime utilities  
corresponding to Outcome II -- noble/peasant version)  
           Lifetime 
    Time Period      Utility 
   1  2  3  4   
Person A Peasant  Noble  Peasant  Noble  Y>X 
Person B Peasant  Noble  Peasant  Noble  Y>X 
 
  
     OR 
 
   I+ (Possible lifetime utilities      
   corresponding to Outcome I -- $100,000/$20,000 version)  
           Lifetime  
    Time Period      Utility 
   1  2  3  4  
Person A $20,000  $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 X 
Person B $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 $20,000  X 
 
 
II+ (Possible lifetime utilities  
corresponding to Outcome II -- $100,000/$20,000 version)  
           Lifetime 
    Time Period      Utility 
   1  2  3  4   
Person A $20,000  $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 Y>X 
Person B $20,000  $100,000 $20,000  $100,000 Y>X 
 
Any SWF that respects the Pareto principle for outcomes and is applied to lifetime 
utilities, including any equity-regarding SWF, will prefer II+ to I+.35 
 
 McKerlie has given us a hypothetical case – a case in which we improve an 
outcome by synchronizing individuals’ attainments with respect to some source of well-
being (here, being a peasant versus being a noble, or having $20.000 versus having 
$100,000) – and argues that the social improvement occurs by equalizing sublifetime 
well-being, without changing the individuals’ lifetime well-being. I suggest, instead, that 
                                                 
35 For a simple way to generate a lifetime utility number Y in II+ that is greater than X in I+, assign a 
sublifetime utility of 2 to being a peasant with other peasants around (or having $20,000 where everyone 
else has $20,000 at the same time), 10 to being a noble with other nobles around, 1 to being a peasant with 
nobles around, and 10.5 to being a noble with peasants around; and then make lifetime utility the sum of 
these context-variant sublifetime utilities.   
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improvement occurs because the synchronization itself changes the individuals’ lifetime 
well-being. 
 
 What favors my interpretation?  To begin, we have the basic case for lifetime 
welfarism, presented earlier.  In addition, and crucially, in cases where the 
synchronization clearly does not affect lifetime well-being, our intuition in favor of 
synchronization is much weaker.  Imagine a society in which everyone works 5 days a 
week, spends one weekend day doing chores, and one weekend day having fun.  In the 
first outcome, half the population does chores on Saturdays and has fun on Sundays; the 
other half has the fun on Saturdays.  In a second outcome, weekend activities are 
synchronized so that everyone does chores on Saturdays.  Or (to use a longer time slice), 
in some society everyone has a minor depressive episode, lasting several years, at one 
point during his or her life.  In one outcome, these episodes occur at different times; in a 
second outcome, they are synchronized. The sublifetime comparativist who sees the 
noble-peasant case or the $100,000/$20,000 income case as characterized by I* and II* 
will also presumably prefer to synchronize weekend chores and fun, or to synchronize 
depressive episodes, in the cases just described.  But the intuition in favor of doing so (I 
suggest) is much weaker in these cases. 
  
 Indeed, as McKerlie has come to acknowledge in more recent work, the problem 
with a sublifetime comparativism that prefers to reduce simultaneous sublifetime 
inequality is that the moral role of simultaneity is suspect.36  Why should we be bothered 
by the fact that person A has a lower sublifetime well-being during some period as 
compared to person B’s sublifetime well-being during the same period,  but not that 
person A has a lower sublifetime well-being during some period as compared to person 
B’s sublifetime well-being during some other period? Consider, again, outcomes I* and 
II*.  In each outcome, there are 16 pairings of the form 1, 2,( ; )k lu u  with 1,ku the sublifetime 
utility of the first person, person A, during period k, and 2,lu  the sublifetime utility of 
person B during period l, k and l each ranging from one to four. Note further that, in each 
outcome, there are four such pairings with the numbers (2,2);  eight pairings (10,2) or 
(2,10); and 4 pairings (10,10).  And, of course, in each outcome the two individuals’ 
lifetime utilities are the same.   So why should we morally prefer II* to I*?  Such a 
preference has no theoretical warrant, given a standard picture of personal identity; it is 
not needed to explain our intuitions in cases such as the noble-peasant or 
$100,000/$20,000 cases, as I have argued; and it is inconsistent with intuitions in other 
cases (such as weekend chores or depressive episode). 
 
 2. Sublifetime Prioritarianism 
 
 McKerlie now advocates a sublifetime prioritarianism.   He suggest, to begin, that 
sublifetime prioritarianism actually provides the best account of individual “prudence” or 
                                                 
36 For recent work in which McKerlie has moved away from sublifetime comparativism and towards 
sublifetime prioritarianism, see Egalitarianism and the Difference between Interpersonal and Intrapersonal 
Judgments, supra note 32; Dimensions of Equality, supra note 32, at 273-88; Justice Between the Young 
and the Old, supra note 32, at 163-74. 
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self-interest.37  On this account, a prudent individual -- one who maximizes her lifetime 
well-being -- will give greater weight to changes in her sublifetime well-being that occur 
when she is at a low level of sublifetime well-being, as compared to changes in her 
sublifetime well-being that occur when she is at a higher level of sublifetime well-being.   
In short, an individual’s lifetime well-being in an outcome is the sum of an increasing, 
strictly concave function of her sublifetime well-being, not a simple sum of her 
sublifetime well-being.         
 
 
     McKerlie’s Account of Prudence   
 
       Lifetime  
    Time Period  Utility (g increasing and strictly concave) 
   1 2 3 4       
Person A 1,1u  1,2u  1,3u  1,4u  1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4( ) ( ) ( ) ( )g u g u g u g u+ + +  
  
Person B 2,1u  2,2u  2,3u  2,4u  2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4( ) ( ) ( ) ( )g u g u g u g u+ + +  
 
 
 Why does this matter?  Note that, even if McKerlie’s account of prudence is 
correct, there is still a difference between an equity-regarding view that evaluates 
outcomes by applying a given prioritarian SWF to lifetime utilities, and an equity-
regarding view that applies that same SWF to sublifetime utilities.  The account of 
prudence does not show that the two approaches converge.38   
                                                 
37 See Dimensions of Equality, supra note 32, at 281-88; Justice Between the Young and the Old, supra note 
32, at 168-74.  
38 The sublifetime prioritarian would evaluate outcomes by applying the increasing and strictly concave g-
function to sublifetime utilities, and summing.  The lifetime prioritarian would evaluate outcomes by using 
the g-function once to determine each individual’s lifetime utility as a function of her sublifetime utilities, 
and then by calculating the sum of the g-function applied to these lifetime utilities.  For example, imagine 
that the lifetime and sublifetime prioritarian both use the square root as the g-function, and that each 
individual’s lifetime utility is the sum of the square root of sublifetime utility.  Then the lifetime 
prioritarian will say that outcome II below is worse than outcome I, while the sublifetime prioritarian will 
say that they are equally good.  
 
    Outcome I (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)  
    Time Period   Lifetime Utility     
   1 2 3 4    
Person A 4 9 4 9   10 
Person B 9 4 9 4   10 
   
  Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20   
  Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.32  
  
Outcome II (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)  
 Time Period   Lifetime Utility   
   1 2 3 4    
Person A 4 25 4 9   12 
Person B 9 4 9 0   8 
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 What it would mean, more narrowly, is that sublifetime prioritarianism would be 
the correct approach to choosing between outcomes if individuals were identical.39  In 
that sense (perhaps?!) McKerlie’s account of prudence might be seen as offering a kind 
of analogical support for sublifetime prioritarianism in the more general and realistic case 
where individuals are not identical.  Further, on McKerlie’s account of prudence, 
sublifetime prioritarianism would never conflict with the Pareto principle applied to 
lifetime utilities (even where individuals are heterogeneous). 40 The divergence between 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20 
 Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.29 (which is less than 6.32)  
 
39  In other words, in comparing outcomes like I and II below, a lifetime prioritarian view that determines 
each individual’s lifetime utility as the sum of a g-function of sublifetime utilities (g increasing and strictly 
concave), and then calculates social value as the sum of that g-function of lifetime utilities, will reach the 
same result as a sublifetime prioritarianism that simply applies the g-function to all the sublifetime utilities 
and sums.   This is illustrated by using the square root as the g-function, but is true for any increasing, 
strictly concave g-function. 
 
  Outcome I (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)    
    Time Period   Lifetime Utility   
   1 2 3 4    
Person A 4 9 4 9   10 
Person B 4 9 4 9   10 
   
  Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20 
  Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.32 
 
Outcome II (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)    
Time Period   Lifetime Utility   
   1 2 3 4    
Person A 25 36 0 0   11 
Person B 25 36 0 0   11 
 
  Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 22 
  Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.63 
 
In such cases of identical individuals, if in one outcome the sum of the g-function of sublifetime utilities is 
greater, than each individual’s lifetime utility must be greater as well, and (because the g function is 
increasing, i.e., the lifetime prioritarian satisfies the Pareto principle for outcomes) the lifetime prioritarian 
must see that outcome as better. 
40 Imagine that one outcome is a Pareto-improvement in lifetime utilities over a second.  In other words, 
either every individual is better off in the first outcome, or some individuals are better off and the others are 
equally well-off.  In either event, it would follow -- since each individual’s lifetime utility is the sum of the 
g-function of her sublifetime utilities -- that the sum of the g-function of sublifetime utilities is greater in 
the first outcome. But then the sublifetime prioritarian must say that the first outcome is better.   For 
example, consider the following case, more once using the square root as the g-function for the sake of 
illustration. 
 
  Outcome I (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)    
    Time Period   Lifetime Utility   
   1 2 3 4    
Person A 4 9 4 9   10 
Person B 9 4 9 4   10 
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sublifetime and lifetime approaches would be limited to pairs of outcomes I and II where 
some individuals have greater lifetime well-being in one outcome and others have greater 
lifetime well-being in the other.  Thus, McKerlie’s account of prudence – if true – would 
soften the conflict between sublifetime and lifetime approaches in the case of 
heterogeneous individuals, and thus might be seen as bolstering any preexisting argument 
for the sublifetime approach. 
 
 But McKerlie’s is almost surely not the correct account of prudence.  If there are 
interactions between an individual’s sublifetime well-being in different stages in 
producing her lifetime well-being, such as improvement effects, additive separability fails 
and lifetime well-being cannot be represented as a function of sublifetime well-being – 
whether a simple sum of sublifetime utility, or the sum of an increasing, strictly concave 
function of sublifetime utility.41  
 
  A second and stronger argument for sublifetime prioritarianism, advanced by 
McKerlie as well as some other philosophers, appeals to our intuitions about pain and 
other forms of suffering.  The claim is that, intuitively, someone who is currently in great 
pain has a stronger claim on our assistance, as opposed to someone who is currently in a 
less painful state, even if the first person’s lifetime well-being is greater.  To simply the 
analysis, here, I will ignore non-hedonic sources of well-being and assume that lifetime 
and sublifetime well-being is just a function of negative affects (pains) and positive 
affects (pleasures). 
  
 Consider first a preference for outcome X over outcome Y in the case below.  
Affects can be strongly, moderately, or mildly negative; neutral; or mildly, moderately, or 
strongly positive.  (In the table, “mod.” is short for “moderately”.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
  Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 20   
  Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.32  
 
Outcome II (showing sublifetime and lifetime utilities)    
Time Period   Lifetime Utility   
   1 2 3 4    
Person A 4 25 4 9   12 
Person B 9 4 9 4   10 
   
  Sum of square root of sublifetime utilities: 22 
  Sum of square root of lifetime utilities: 6.63 
   
41 On additive separability, see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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    Status quo 
    Time Period 
  1  2  3  4  
Person A mod. positive mod. positive strong negative mod. positive 
Person B mild negative mild negative mild negative mild negative 
  
 
    Outcome X (relieving A’s pain in period 3) 
Time Period 
  1  2  3  4 
Person A mod. positive mod. positive mod. negative mod. positive   
Person B mild negative mild negative mild negative mild negative 
 
 
    Outcome Y (relieving B’s pain in period 3) 
Time Period 
  1  2  3  4 
Person A mod. positive mod. positive strong negative mod. positive 
Person B mild negative mild negative neutral  mild negative 
 
In the status quo, person A’s affects are moderately positive in all periods except period 
3, where he suffers great pain, while person B’s affects are mildly negative in all the 
periods.  In outcome X, we give A the pain relief in period 3, thereby moving him from a 
strongly negative state in that period to a moderately negative state. In outcome Y, we 
give B the pain relief in period 3, thereby moving him from a mildly negative state to a 
neutral state.  
 
 Grant the intuition that we prefer outcome X to outcome Y in this case.  This sort 
of intuition about pain relief is one that the lifetime welfarist can accommodate.  It is 
possible that the lifetime well-being A would experience, as a result of a strongly 
negative affect in one period, is worse than the lifetime well-being of all the other lives in 
the example.  The strongly negative affect in that period may “ruin” that whole life, either 
because of non-additivities, or even within the context of an additively separable model 
of lifetime well-being, so that the choice between X and Y is as follows. 
   
 
   Outcome X (relieving A’s pain in period 3) 
     Time period     Lifetime 
  1  2  3  4   utility 
Person A mod. positive mod. positive mod. negative mod. positive  56 
Person B mild negative mild negative mild negative mild negative  48 
 
   Outcome Y (relieving B’s pain in period 3) 
     Time period     Lifetime 
  1  2  3  4   utility 
Person A mod. positive mod. positive strong negative mod. positive  45 
Person B mild negative mild negative neutral  mild negative  49 
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Any prioritarian SWF, applied to lifetime utilities, will pick outcome X over outcome 
Y.42 
 
 But there are other examples involving pain relief that a lifetime view has more 
difficulty handling.  Klemens Kappel provides the following example: 
 
 In a casualty department in a hospital two persons, A and B, are in pain. Unfortunately, 
only one of them can be given pain relieving treatment since there is a shortage of the particular 
painkiller needed.  A’s pain is much stronger than B’s pain.  However, B did in the past suffer 
from pains similar to those he has now, and these pains went on for a considerably longer time and 
were not treated.  … Suppose, finally, that whoever we treat, the benefit will be the same because 
A’s stronger pain will be only partly relieved, while B’s pain will be fully relieved.43 
 
Now, the outcomes are X* and Y*.  B is in strongly negative affects in all periods except 
period 3; A is in a strongly negative affect in period 3, otherwise in a moderate positive 
state; and we have to choose between giving the pain relief to A in period 3 (outcome 
X*) or to B in period 3 (outcome Y*). 
 
 
 
    Status quo* 
    Time Period 
  1  2  3  4  
Person A mod. positive mod. positive strong negative mod. positive 
Person B strong negative strong negative mild negative strong negative 
  
 
    Outcome X* (relieving A’s pain in period 3) 
Time Period 
  1  2  3  4 
Person A mod. positive mod. positive mod. negative mod. positive   
Person B strong negative strong negative mild negative strong negative 
 
 
    Outcome Y* (relieving B’s pain in period 3) 
Time Period 
  1  2  3  4 
Person A mod. positive mod. positive strong negative mod. positive 
Person B strong negative strong negative neutral  strong negative 
 
 In this kind of case, by contrast with the first pain case, it seems very clear that 
A’s lifetime well-being will be higher than B’s even if we give B the pain relief and not 
                                                 
42 To get these lifetime utilities within the context of an additively separable model, assume that lifetime 
utility is the simple sum of sublifetime utility; that the sublifetime utility of a strongly negative state is 0; 
and that the sublifetime utilities of moderately negative, mildly negative, neutral, mildly positive, 
moderately positive, and strongly positive states are, respectively, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. Given 
anonymity, the lifetime prioritarian must count the second outcome as equal to one in which person A gets 
49 and person B gets 45, which in turn is Pareto inferior in lifetime utilities to the first outcome. 
43 Kappel, supra note 33, at 211.  See also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 341, 344 (1984). 
Derek Parfit, Comments, 96 ETHICS 832, 869-70 (1986). 
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A.  Therefore, an intuition that we should choose outcome X *(relieving A’s sublifetime 
pain) is tougher for the lifetime welfarist to handle. 
  
 But maybe not impossible. If giving A the pain relief produces a greater change in 
lifetime well-being than giving B the pain relief, a lifetime prioritarian could justify the 
choice of X* over Y*. In other words, the facts in X* and Y* might correspond to the 
utilities in X+ and Y+.   Assume that strongly, moderately, and mildly negative affects 
have a sublifetime utility of 0, 3, 5 respectively; a neutral affect has a sublifetime utility 
of 7; mildly, moderately, and strongly positive affects have a sublifetime utility of 9, 11, 
and 13 respectively and that (absent an improvement affect) lifetime utility is the simple 
sum of sublifetime utility. 
 
   X+ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities 
   corresponding to outcome X*) 
 
     Time period     Lifetime 
  1  2  3  4   utility 
Person A 11  11  3  11   36  
Person B 0  0  5  0   5 
 
   Y+ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities 
   corresponding to outcome Y*) 
     Time period     Lifetime 
  1  2  3  4   utility 
Person A 11  11  0  11   33 
Person B 0  0  7  0   7 
 
Observe that a utilitarian SWF, applied to lifetime utilities, will choose outcome X+ over 
outcome Y+ (41 is greater than 40) and a prioritarian SWF which is sufficiently close to 
utilitarianism and which is applied to lifetime utilities will do so as well. 
 
 Kappel, however, has tried to word the case so that the pain relief produces the 
very same change in sublifetime and lifetime well-being whomever we treat.  He intends 
that X* and Y* be represented by the sublifetime and lifetime utilities in X++ and Y++.  
(I have changed the sublifetime utility of a strongly negative affect from 0 to 1, so that 
the change in sublifetime and lifetime utility is 2 whether we give the pain relief to A or 
B.) 
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X++ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities 
   corresponding to outcome X*) 
 
     Time period     Lifetime 
  1  2  3  4   utility 
Person A 11  11  3  11   36  
Person B 1  1  5  1   8 
 
   Y++ (possible sublifetime and lifetime utilities 
   corresponding to outcome Y*) 
 
     Time period     Lifetime 
  1  2  3  4   utility 
Person A 11  11  1  11   34 
Person B 1  1  7  1   10 
   
 
Choosing X++ over Y++  would seem impossible for a lifetime equity-regarding 
welfarist to justify.  Any lifetime prioritarian will choose Y++44; a lifetime sufficientist 
will choose Y++ or be indifferent; and although in principle a lifetime comparativist view 
might fall within my definition of equity-regarding and choose X++, that just shows the 
overbreadth of that definition.      
  
 So has the lifetime welfarist been cornered?  Maybe not.  If X* and Y* are 
accurately represented by the utility numbers in X++ and Y++, we may no longer have 
the intuition that we should choose X*. 
 
 Even if we do have the intuition that we should choose X* over Y* when  
represented by the utility numbers in X++ and Y++, that is not necessarily strong 
evidence in favor of sublifetime welfarism, as against lifetime welfarism.  The cases that 
are deployed in the literature to show a preference for aiding someone at a low 
sublifetime level of well-being during some period, even when she has a higher level of 
lifetime well-being, all involve pain and suffering.  It is difficult to construct such cases 
where the well-being differentials involve the absence of a “good,” rather than an 
affirmative “bad” (suffering resulting from physical pain, malnourishment, homelessness, 
etc.)  Imagine that B has had a life without enjoyment, and will likely lack enjoyment in 
the future, but this month is enjoying himself moderately; A has had an enjoyable life in 
the past, and will likely enjoy himself in the future, but this month is bored.   We can 
increase B’s enjoyment by some amount, or A’s enjoyment by the same amount.  The 
sublifetime prioritarian will say that we should increase A’s enjoyment – but that seems 
counterintuitive, or at least is less strongly intuitive than giving A the pain relief in the 
X* /Y* case. 
 
 A joint intuition (1) in favor of X* over Y* even when represented by the utility 
numbers in X++ and Y++, but (2) to give the enjoyment to B rather than A in the 
enjoyment case, is not evidence in favor of sublifetime prioritarianism.  Rather it points 
                                                 
44 This is because Y++ is produced from X++ by effecting a Pigou-Dalton transfer in lifetime utilities, 
namely transferring 2 units of lifetime utility from A, at level 36, to B, at level 8. 
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beyond welfarism entirely, to a nonwelfarist duty to alleviate current pain and suffering 
even when our best welfarist account (lifetime equity-regarding welfarism), would 
require a different course of action.  Seeing the pain cases this way could lead us to reject 
welfarism.  Alternatively, however, in the familiar process of “reflective equilibrium,” we 
might stick by the theory of welfarism – for all the other reasons that warrant it – and see 
the intuition as a real but recalcitrant one, inconsistent with the moral view that we take, 
on balance, to be best justified.  
 
 3. Sublifetime Sufficientism 
  
 We have considered challenges to lifetime welfarism in favor of, first, sublifetime 
comparativism and, then, sublifetime prioritarianism.  For symmetry, we should consider 
a third challenge: that sufficientism is best construed in sublifetime rather than lifetime 
terms. 
 
The worry is that lifetime sufficientism seems implausible. The essence of 
sufficientism is the notion that there is some threshold of well-being, above which claims 
for redistribution become qualitatively weaker.  What would that threshold be, in terms of 
lifetime well-being? The point is not just that it would be hard to justify a particular 
lifetime threshold, rather than taking it as a primitive grounded in intuitions.  (After all, it 
might be hard for prioritarians of any stripe to justify a particular curvature for their 
SWF.)   The point is rather that (I hazard to guess) most of us lack any intuitions at all 
about what a “sufficient” lifetime well-being would be.  Instead, intuitive thresholds tend 
to be momentary or sublifetime: being well fed now, being sufficiently clothed now, 
having shelter now, having enough income for this year, and so forth. 
  
 However, some sufficientists have entertained the possibility of lifetime 
sufficientism. Roger Crisp, a leading proponent of sufficientism, does so.  
 
 [I claimed] that the compassion principle provides the best account of when, and why, we should 
give priority to the worse off. Compassion for any being gives out, I suggested, when that being 
has enough welfare, and it may be based on assessment of a being’s life as a whole or on the 
individual’s position at the time of assessment.45 
 
Equity-regarding welfarists, in short, are not compelled to choose between (1) 
sufficientism, and the (2) the basic case for lifetime welfarism, given the continuity of 
personal identity over time.  Lifetime sufficientism incorporates both (1) and (2).   
Alternatively, the equity-regarding welfarist could respond to the counterintuitiveness of 
lifetime sufficientism by abandoning (1), preserving equity-regard plus a whole-life time-
slice in the form of lifetime comparativism or prioritarianism. 
 
To be sure, another response is to abandon (2) but not (1): to adopt sublifetime 
sufficientism.  Sublifetime sufficientism is, admittedly, intuitively more appealing than 
lifetime sufficientism.   Momentary or periodic well-being poverty lines seem less odd 
than a lifetime well-being poverty line.  On the other hand, even a momentary well-being 
                                                 
45 Crisp, supra note 18, at 763. 
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poverty line is hard to specify-- a point borne out by the literature on poverty 
measurement, where the problem of identifying the threshold of “utility” poverty is seen 
as a difficult, unresolved problem.  Sublifetime sufficientism, I suggest, is not a moral 
view which is sufficiently powerful and unproblematic to warrant us in rejecting the basic 
case for lifetime welfarism. 
  
 C.  Derek Parfit: Equity-Regarding Welfarism plus Non-standard personal 
identity 
 
 What if we revise the standard account of personal identity? The standard view 
says that a single human being is, determinately, a single person (in normal cases) from 
birth to death and that personhood and personal identity are morally significant 
properties.  One possible revision to this view says that different stages of a human life 
are, determinately, different persons.  A single human is one person from the age of zero 
to 20, a different person from the age of 20 to 40, and so forth.  But this view, on a little 
reflection, seems unappealing.  There is normally no abrupt change in psychological 
abilities, or break in psychological connectedness, at any point in life (at least after the 
development of basic abilities in early childhood), that would constitute the determinate 
ending of the existence of one person and the beginning of another. 
 
 Derek Parfit, in his seminal book Reasons and Persons, takes a very different 
tack.46  Parfit’s views are subtle and complicated, and I can only crudely summarize them 
here.   A human, at one point in time, may be more or less psychologically connected 
with himself at a prior point in time -- or for that matter with a different human.  A 
human-at-a-time H is psychologically connected with a human-at-a-time H* if there are 
links of memory, belief, desire, intention and so forth between the two.  For example, H* 
and H have the same belief.  Or H* remembers something that H experiences.   Note that 
psychological connectedness is intransitive: if H* is connected with H+, and H+ with 
H++, it doesn’t follow that H++ is connected with H*.   A different relation is continuity, 
namely the existence of overlapping chains of connectedness, which is transitive.   If H* 
is connected to H+, and H+ to H++, then H*, H+, and H++ are all continuous with each 
other.   Parfit then suggests that personal identity consists in psychological continuity 
and/or connectedness with the right cause -- paradigmatically having the same brain. 
 
 One implication of Parfit’s account is that personal identity can be indeterminate.   
It might be the case that two particular persons are neither determinately identical to each 
other, nor determinately not identical.  This is striking, because we normally think of the 
identity relation -- at least with respect to objects such as persons -- as being determinate.  
 
                                                 
46 See PARFIT, supra note 43, at 199-347. Parfit also discusses personal identity in Comments, supra note 
43; and Derek Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 292 (Raymond Martin & John 
Barresi eds., 2003). For an excellent recent treatment of personal identity that discusses Parfit’s views, see 
JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING 3-94 (2002). For a discussion focused on the implications of 
Parfit’s account of personal identity for morality, see Bart Schultz, Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism, 96 
ETHICS 721 (1986). 
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 Importantly for our purposes, however, Parfit does not argue that personal identity 
is indeterminate within the confines of a normal human life.  His examples of 
indeterminacy involve esoteric cases where a spectrum of brain operations produce fewer 
and fewer psychological connections, or less and less preservation of brain matter, 
between consecutive stages of a human life.  As for the case of a normal human life, 
Parfit seems to say that personal identity over time is determinate, or at least exists to a 
very high degree.  He writes: 
  
  In ordinary cases, questions about our identity have answers. In such cases, there is a fact 
about personal identity, and Reductionism [Parfit’s account] is one view about what kind of fact 
this is.  On this view, personal identity just consists in physical and/or psychological continuity. … 
 
  In the problem cases [such as the spectrum cases], things are different.47 
 
How can Parfit say that ordinary human lives aren’t “problem cases” for personal 
identity?  Imagine that it is a high degree of psychological continuity, not connectedness, 
that makes for a high degree of personal identity.  In other words, two temporal stages of 
a human life are parts of the same person, to a high degree, if the human’s brain is the 
same and there is a chain of temporal stages linking the two -- such that each link in the 
chain is psychologically connected to the next, to a high degree.   On this version of 
Parfit’s account, the absence of strong direct psychological connections between 
childhood and old age would be consistent with a high degree of psychological continuity 
(and hence personal identity) from childhood to old age.48 
 
 Parfit does challenge the whole lifetime account of equality, even for normal 
humans -- he suggests that distributive justice may end up taking the form of a 
sublifetime prioritarianism49 -- but his challenge does not involve the claim that personal 
identity is normally indeterminate.   Rather, the challenge rests on a different aspect of 
Parfit’s account of personal identity: its reductive or deflationary character.  Once we see 
that personal identity, determinate or not, is reducible to facts about psychological and 
physical connectedness and/or continuity, personal identity will become less significant.  
“Personal identity is not what matters.”50 It will become less significant as a matter of  
individual rationality: whether some experience happens to me or some other person will 
be less significant in shaping my rational desires.  And personal identity will become less 
significant as a matter of morality.   “On the Reductionist View, we believe that the fact 
of personal identity over time is less deep, or involves less. We may therefore claim that 
this fact has less moral importance.”51    
 
For example, imagine two cases: one in which some person suffers a loss at one 
time, and another person experiences an equal gain at a later time; a second in which one 
person suffers a loss at one time, and that same person experiences an equal gain at a later 
                                                 
47 Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, supra note 46, at. 303. 
48 See MCMAHAN, supra note 46, at 39-41. 
49 See PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 43, at 329-47; Parfit, Comments, supra note 43, at 837-
43, 869-72. 
50 PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 43, at 217. 
51 Id. at 337-38. 
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time.  Standardly, egalitarian theorists see these cases as sharply distinct -- because in the 
second case, it is the same person who suffers the effects, while in the first case it is two 
different persons.  Parfit suggests that, once we deflate personal identity to its physical 
and psychological basis, our inclination to see the cases as qualitatively morally distinct 
will weaken. 
  
 There are a number of reactions to this suggestion.  First, it is not clear that 
reducing some moral concept to its physical or psychological basis weakens the hold of 
that concept.  If, for example, we reduce the concept of “life” to its physical basis, does 
that mean that morality must care less about killing?52   More generally, most moral 
theorists now accept that moral facts supervene on physical and psychological facts -- 
more crisply, on physical facts, since psychological facts themselves supervene on the 
physical.  So there is a sense in which all moral concepts -- well-being, intention, harm, 
injury, choice, action -- are reducible to the physical and psychological.    
 
This fact might mean that morality itself is less significant; but it is hard to see 
how it would favor one moral view over another.  In other words, Parfit’s deflationary 
view of personal identity, if simply one part of a general deflation of moral properties to 
psychological and physical properties, might be plausibly thought to lack implications 
within morality.  In particular, it might be thought not to favor sublifetime over lifetime 
egalitarianism. 
 
Second, assume that Parfit has succeeded in especially deflating the concept of a 
person.  We continue to care about doing the morally right thing, and (if we are 
welfarists), to think of that in terms of human well-being -- even though we recognize 
that, ultimately, well-being is just a matter of the arrangement of molecules -- but are less 
impressed by the distinction between what occurs intrapersonally and interpersonally.  
The question, then, is why we would shift from lifetime to sublifetime egalitarianism.  
We might just shift to utilitarianism.  The thought behind lifetime egalitarianism is that it 
may be unfair to burden one person for the sake of another -- an unfairness the utilitarian 
doesn’t recognize -- but that effects within a normal life do not implicate this principle, 
because they are effects on the same person.  Having excised or deflated the concept of 
“person,” will we retain our concern for fair distribution but revise it to say that it may be 
unfair to burden one moment in a human life for the sake of another?  Perhaps we might 
respond, instead, by saying that fair distribution -- across persons or temporal stages -- is 
not important at all.  
 
Indeed, Parfit acknowledges as much.  He suggests that his account of personal 
identity might plausibly change the scope of distributive principles (from lifetimes to 
sublifetimes), but acknowledges that it also might change their weight. 
 
[Distributive] principles are often held to be founded on the separateness, or non-identity, of 
different persons.  This fact is less deep on the Reductionist View, since personal identity is less 
deep.  … [I]t is [therefore] more plausible to give less weight to distributive principles.  If we … 
                                                 
52 See Mark Johnston, Human Concerns without Superlative Selves, in PERSONAL IDENTITY, supra note 46 
at 260; Schultz, supra note 46, at 731. 
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come to believe that the unity of a life involves no more than the various relations between the 
experiences in this life, it becomes more plausible to be more concerned about the quality of 
experiences, and less concerned about whose experiences they are.  This gives some support to the 
Utilitarian view.53 
 
 In sum, there are a range of plausible reactions that the lifetime equity-regarding 
welfarist might have, once he comes to accept an account of personal identity, such as 
Parfit’s, that allows for identity to be indeterminate in some cases, and that reduces it to 
physical and psychological facts.  One reaction is to insist that similar deflations (and 
indeterminacies) can be created for all normative concepts, and to stick by his lifetime 
equity-regarding view.  Another is to shift to utilitarianism.  Yet a third is to shift to 
sublifetime equity-regarding welfarism.  This third possibility is reasonable, but hardly 
compelled.   
 
III. EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST APPROACHES TO SOCIAL CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
 
 Part I grappled with the time-slice problem.  This Part raises a cross cutting 
problem, namely uncertainty.  Chris Sanchirico and I have engaged that problem at 
length in prior work.54  We distinguish between “ex post” and “ex ante” approaches to 
welfarist social choice under uncertainty, and ultimately defend the “ex post” approach. 
I will not repeat our analysis but will quickly summarize the high points, specifically 
focusing on the case of lifetime welfarism. The ”ex post” account of choice under 
uncertainty, together with lifetime welfarism, undergirds the array of practical 
prescriptions that are surveyed in Parts IV and V below. 
 
 Given certainty, each choice available to the decisionmaker can be represented as 
an N-entry vector of lifetime utilities: the particular set of lifetime utilities that would 
result were she to make that choice. Given uncertainty, each choice can be represented as 
a set of utility vectors, or matrix: one N-entry vector for each possible prior state of the 
world.  The decisionmaker, we assume, can attach probabilities to these different possible 
states.   With those probabilities in hand, plus her social welfare function, the 
decisionmaker might calculate a vector of expected utilities for each choice, and then 
apply the SWF to that.   This is the “ex ante” approach.  Alternatively, the decisionmaker 
might apply the SWF to each of the possible utility vectors, discount the SWF value of 
each vector by the probability of that vector, and sum.  This is the “ex post” approach.  
  
  Crucially, the “ex ante” and “ex post” methods for applying an SWF under 
uncertainty can diverge.  To see that possibility, and to get a better sense of how the 
approaches work, consider the following, extremely simple example, involving two 
persons (Jim and June), two possible choices A and B,  two equiprobable states, and a 
prioritarian social welfare function, w, equaling the sum of the square root of utilities.  
The vectors of utilities in each state, for each choice, represent Jim’s and June’s lifetime 
utilities in that state.  
 
                                                 
53PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS, supra note 43, at 346. 
54 See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 7. 
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     Choice A 
 
    State 1  State 2 
     p =.5  p = .5 
 
  Jim  4  9 Jim’s expected utility = 6.5 
 
 June  0  4 June’s expected utility = 2 
     
    w(4,0)  = w(9,4)= 
 √4+√0= 2 √9 + √4= 5  
 
 w applied ex ante to choice A:  √6.5 + √2 = 3.96 
  
 w applied ex post to choice A: 2×.5 + 5×.5 = 3.5 
 
  
     Choice B 
 
    State 1  State 2 
     p =.5  p = .5 
 
  Jim  3.5  3.5 Jim’s expected utility = 3.5 
 
 June  3.5  3.5 June’s expected utility = 3.5 
     
    w(3.5,3.5)  = w(3.5,3.5)= 
 √3.5+√3.5 3.74 
= 3.74    
  
 w applied ex ante to choice B:  √3.5 + √3.5 = 3.74 
  
w applied ex post to choice B: 3.74×.5 + 3.74×.5 = 3.74 
  
  
Consider, first, the “ex ante” approach.  Using that approach, we first calculate the 
vector of expected utilities for each choice, and then apply the SWF to that.  Here, the 
vector of expected utilities associated with choice A is (6.5, 2) and the vector associated 
with choice B is (3.5, 3.5).   So A is assigned a value of 3.96 (√6.5 + √2), while B is 
assigned a value of 3.74 (√3.5 + √3.5).    
 
Consider, next, the “ex post” approach.  Now, we first apply our SWF in each 
possible state, and then take probabilities into account, discounting each SWF value by 
its probability and adding.  In the case of choice A, the SWF value in state 1 is √4 + √0 = 
2. The SWF value in state 2 is √9 + √4 = 5.  The expected w value yielded by A is .5 x 2 
+.5 x 5 = 3.5   Turning to choice B, it emerges that the ex post approach assigns that a 
value of 3.74.   
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So what has happened is that the “ex ante” approach yields the judgment that 
choice A is better than choice B (3.96 > 3.74), while the ”ex post” approach yields the 
judgment that choice B is better than choice A (3.74 > 3.5).   The “ex ante” approach 
thinks of a given choice as a package of individual lotteries over outcomes, one for each 
individual in the population, and aggregates the values of these lotteries to arrive at an 
overall valuation of the choice.  The “ex post” approach thinks of a given choice as a 
package of possible outcomes (each yielding a particular distribution of utilities), and 
values each outcome, then calculates an expected outcome value, to arrive at an overall 
valuation of the choice.  As the simple example shows, these two approaches can diverge. 
  
 Does the example generalize?  Indeed it does -- quite a bit!  It turns out that the 
“ex ante” and “ex post” approaches can diverge for any SWF other than the utilitarian.   
For any possible choice situation, the utilitarian SWF will rank choices the same way 
regardless of whether we apply it “ex post” or “ex ante.” It makes no difference whether 
utilitarians conceptualize choices as vectors of expected utilities, or probability 
distributions over possible vectors of actual utilities. But, when we shift from 
utilitarianism to equity-regarding SWFs, the two approaches are genuinely different.  For 
any equity-regarding SWF (comparativist, prioritarian, sufficientist), or indeed any 
nonutilitarian SWF, there will be some choice situations where the two approaches yield 
different recommendations.    
   
 In other words, lifetime equity-regarding welfarists must decide whether they care 
about the distribution of individuals’ expected lifetime well-being, or about the expected 
distribution of individuals’ lifetime well-being.  These are just different approaches.  
  
 So which approach to choice under uncertainty should equity-regarding welfarists 
adopt?  The ex ante approach certainly has its proponents.  Some welfare economists who 
have written specifically about choice under uncertainty favor it.   And, more generally, 
much scholarship about law and policy tends to implicitly adopt it -- to think about 
different policies as different package of expected utilities for the different individuals in 
the population.  
 
 Sanchirico and I contend, however, that the “ex post” approach is the better 
specification of welfarism -- and in this have some support in the existing literature.  The 
core of the argument is the “sure thing” principle: what many take to be a basic premise 
of rationality, and in any event seems to be the hallmark of consequentialism.  The sure-
thing principle says that, if a choice involves a probability distribution over outcomes, 
and a revised choice is produced by swapping some of the outcomes for outcomes that 
the decisionmaker regards as equally good (without changing their probabilities), the 
decisionmaker should be indifferent between the original and revised choices. It is easy to 
see that the application of an equity-regarding SWF using the ex post approach always 
satisfies the sure thing principle, while the ex ante application of an equity-regarding 
SWF will sometimes violate that principle.  A second important argument is that the “ex 
ante” approach is time-inconsistent.   
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 In sum: A substantial case can be made that lifetime welfarism should be outfitted 
for conditions of uncertainty by adopting the “ex post” approach, which tells the 
decisionmaker to maximize the expectation of her SWF (be it comparativist, prioritarian, 
or sufficientist).  Let us now see what lifetime welfarism, thus outfitted, implies for law 
and policy. 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFETIME VIEW: MEASURING EQUALITY AND POVERTY 
 
 This Part discusses what lifetime equity-regarding welfarism, together with an ex 
post account of choice under uncertainty, implies for the measurement of equality and 
poverty.   The next Part turns to policy choice. 
  
 A. Equality Measurement 
 
 A substantial body of empirical work in economics seeks to measure inequality.  
Much of this work focuses on the equality of incomes.  A close related body of work 
consists of “incidence analysis”: quantifying whether taxes or other policy measures are 
“regressive” or “progressive,” depending on how their burdens are borne across the 
income distribution.  More recently, health economists have begun to employ the equality 
metrics developed in the equality-of-income literature to study the distribution of health 
or longevity.  
 
 The choice between lifetime and sublifetime welfarism has direct and significant  
implications for all these projects. 
 
  1. Income Equality 
  
 Income-inequality studies -- which estimate the Gini coefficient, the coefficient of 
variation, or some other quantitative measure of the degree of inequality of some 
distribution of incomes -- are informational inputs for egalitarian welfarists.55  Income or 
some transformation of income (such as the logarithm of income) is a measurable proxy 
for well-being.  At least some inequality metrics correspond to particular SWFs -- a point 
stressed by Anthony Atkinson in seminal work.56  To be sure, inequality measurement 
alone should not guide policy choice.  A policy might produce a more equal distribution 
of well-being, but with a lower total amount. Any sensible SWF should be sensitive to 
both considerations, not merely the degree of inequality.   But the well-established 
enterprise of measuring income inequality can readily by seen, by the welfarist, as 
furnishing important data for policymakers. 
 
 Most work in this area has focused on quantifying the inequality of annual 
incomes.  But there are many economists who believe that the inequality of lifetime 
                                                 
55 For overviews of this large scholarly field, see, e.g., HANDBOOK OF INCOME INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT 
(Jacques Silber ed., 1999);   F.A. Cowell, Measurement of Inequality¸ in 1 HANDBOOK OF INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION 87 (2000); HILDE BOJER, DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 65-133 
(2003). 
56 See A.B. Atkinson, On the Measurement of Inequality, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 244 (1970).  
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income has greater normative relevance  -- a position buttressed, of course, by the 
arguments of this Article -- and some have sought to measure it. 57  
 
 Take lifetime income (or some transformation of lifetime income) as a proxy for 
lifetime welfare.  Why, in turn, isn’t the distribution of annual income a good proxy for 
the distribution of lifetime income?   There are (at least) two fundamental mechanisms 
that drive a wedge between the equality of annual versus lifetime income.58  One is the 
age distribution of earnings (and thus income).  Individuals earn more as they age and 
become more educated and skilled, up to a point; then, with retirement, earnings decline.   
To see how this alone can produce a wedge between the equality of lifetime and annual 
income, imagine that the age profile of earnings is completely fixed, and no one dies 
prematurely.  Everyone in the population, then, has the same lifetime earnings; but 
because the population is composed of different age cohorts, earnings in any year are 
unequally distributed. 
  
 The second mechanism is income mobility within age cohorts.  Imagine that 
everyone in the population is part of the same age cohort -- they were all born in the same 
year -- and that the cohort’s mean earnings do not change at all with age. However, there 
is variation around the mean.  In any given year, some in the age cohort earn above the 
mean, others below it.  Further, there is earnings mobility -- at the extreme, whether 
someone is above the mean one year does not influence whether she is above it the 
following year.  Then, it is easy to see, lifetime income could be much more equally 
distributed than annual income. 
  
 The precise relation between the equality of lifetime and annual income will 
depend, not just on income dynamics in the population, but also on the equality metric 
used.  Still, economists have made some progress in formalizing the point that annual 
studies cannot generally be taken as good proxies for lifetime studies. Anthony Shorrocks 
has shown that, for a large class of inequality measures, inequality of lifetime income can 
never be greater than the average of inequality of annual income (and may be smaller, at 
the limit zero).59   
 
Is it, in fact, feasible to measure the distribution of lifetime income?  How can 
empirical work of this kind be undertaken?  Various approaches have been used.  The 
most straightforward is to employ data from a longitudinal (or “panel”) dataset, where a 
sample of the population is selected and then tracked over multiple years.   For example, 
the Swedish Level of Living Survey interviewed a large sample of Swedes over many 
                                                 
57 On the time dimension in income-inequality measurement, see generally A.B. Atkinson & F. 
Bourguignon, Introduction: Income Distribution and Economics, in HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 
supra note 55, at 38-40; John Creedy, Lifetime versus Annual Income Distribution, in HANDBOOK OF 
INCOME INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT, supra note 55, at 513; Morton Paglin, The Measurement and Trend 
of Inequality: A Basic Revision, in 65 AM. ECON. REV. 598 (1975). 
58 See Daniel Millimet et al., Bounding Lifetime Income Using a Cross Section of Data, 49 REV. INCOME & 
WEALTH 205 (2003). 
59 See Anthony Shorrocks, Income Inequality and Income Mobility, 19 J. ECON. THEORY 376, 379-81 & n.7 
(1978). The class of inequality measures includes those derived from the Atkinson family of SWFs; the 
square of the coefficient of variation; and the Theil coefficient.    
 39
years, and contains information about each individual’s income for a period of 38 years.  
Anders Bjorklund calculated the Gini coefficient of the present value of individuals’ total 
income over this 38-year period for different age cohorts, as well as the Gini coefficient 
of annual incomes in various years.  He found that the long-term Ginis were 35 to 40 
percent lower than the annual Ginis.60  Similarly, Jeremy Arkes examined data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which has conducted annual interviews with the same 
families since the 1960s.  Arkes looked at the income of male heads of households, 
comparing the Gini coefficient of the distribution of 5-year earnings for different periods 
with the average of the Gini coefficient of annual earnings.61  In every comparison, 5-
year earnings were more equally distributed than annual earnings.  
 
 A second approach to estimating the distribution of lifetime income involves 
simulation analysis.62  A third approach is to measure the distribution of some proxy for 
lifetime income.  Many economists take an individual’s annual consumption -- meaning 
her annual expenditures on goods and services -- to be a better proxy for lifetime income 
than annual income.  The basic insight is that rational individuals with access to 
intertemporal financial markets will “smooth” consumption over a lifetime, saving some 
income in high-income periods for expenditure in later periods, and borrowing or 
spending from savings to finance consumption in low-income periods.  A substantial 
body of empirical work has therefore examined the inequality of annual consumption, as 
opposed to annual income, as a way to estimate the inequality of lifetime income.63   
 
 Does the choice between annual and lifetime income as the temporal unit for 
studying income equality turn out to be a significant choice?  Do empirical studies that 
rely upon lifetime income as the temporal unit regularly reach substantially different 
conclusions than studies that rely upon annual income?  The answer, pretty clearly, is 
yes.  To begin, the choice clearly affects estimates of the degree of inequality.  As already 
mentioned, both Arkes and Bjorklund, who used longitudinal studies and the Gini 
coefficient as the measure of inequality, found that lifetime or long-term income 
inequality was lower than annual income inequality.  More generally, virtually every 
work that has applied some inequality metric to lifetime or long-term versus annual 
income has reached the same result -- not surprisingly, given Shorrocks’ proof.  Lifetime 
inequality is always lower.    We hardly live in an egalitarian world; but the world is 
revealed to be less marred by inequality, once one takes the lifetime perspective, than it 
appears to be from the annual perspective. 
  
                                                 
60 Anders Bjorklund, A Comparison Between Actual Distributions of Annual and Lifetime Income: Sweden 
1951-89, 39 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 377 (1993). 
61 Jeremy Arkes, Trends in Long-Run Versus Cross-Section Earnings Inequality in the 1970s and 1980s, 44 
REV. INCOME & WEALTH 199 (1998).  
62 See, e.g., ANN HARDING, LIFETIME INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION (1993);,Christopher J. 
Flinn, Labor Market Structure and Inequality: A Comparison of Italy and the United States, 69 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 611 (2002). 
63 See DANIEL T. SLESNICK, CONSUMPTION AND SOCIAL WELFARE (2001); Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri, 
Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 163 
(2006); id. at 163-64 (citing sources). 
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The choice of annual versus lifetime income may lead to different conclusions, 
not just about the amount of inequality in some population, but also about the change in 
equality over time, or about the causes of inequality, or about the comparative degree of 
inequality in different populations.  Daniel Slesnick’s scholarship on consumption 
provides an excellent illustration of the possible link between the choice of unit and 
conclusions about equality dynamics.  Many believe that the U.S. has become a less 
egalitarian society in recent years, and this view is borne out by annual-income studies.  
For example, the Gini coefficient of annual income decreases from the 1950s through the 
late 1960s, but then changes direction and increases pretty steadily from 1970 through the 
late 1990s.  (This is the so-called “U-turn in income inequality”64). Slesnick challenges 
this pessimistic picture with evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a cross-
sectional study of household consumption. Slesnick’s conclusion is as follows: 
 
[T]he widely reported U-turn in inequality in the United States is an artifact of the inappropriate 
use of family income as a measure of welfare.  When well-being is defined to be a function of per 
equivalent consumption, inequality either decreased over the sample period or remained 
essentially unchanged depending on the choice of equivalence scales.  This conclusion arises 
because the distribution of consumption differs sharply from the distribution of income, which, in 
turn, is due to the distribution of savings and dissavings across the population. . . .  
 
[This conclusion] has important policy implications. The conventional wisdom is that rising 
earnings inequality has been offset by income transfers until 1973. The increasing level of income 
inequality since 1973 has led some analysts to the conclusion that the government must redouble 
its efforts to bring about greater equality in the distribution of well-being.  My results suggests that 
there is no U-turn to explain and no increase in inequality to overcome.65 
 
 Much empirical work on inequality tries to illuminate the causes of inequality in 
some population by decomposing overall inequality into inequality between certain 
groups plus inequality within the groups.  Here, too, the choice of temporal perspective 
can be significant.   Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri, like Slesnick, examine trends in the 
inequality of annual income and consumption in the U.S.  They reach conclusions similar 
to Slesnick’s, namely that “despite the surge in income inequality in the  
U.S., consumption inequality has increased only moderately,” and also find the following:  
 “[I]ncome inequality has increased substantially, both between and within groups of 
households with the same characteristics (such as education, sex, and race), but even 
though between-group consumption inequality has tracked between-group income 
inequality quite closely, within group consumption inequality has increased much less 
than within-group income inequality.” 66  Finally, for a nice illustration of the effect of 
temporal perspective on comparisons of inequality between populations, consider 
Christopher Flinn’s use of a simulation model to compare earnings inequality in the U.S. 
with Italy, an economy where workers tend to change employers less often and have less 
mobile earnings.  Flinn finds that the inequality of hourly wages is three times greater in 
the U.S. than in Italy, but that the inequality of lifetime earnings in the two countries is 
the same.67 
                                                 
64 See SLESNICK, supra note 63, at 2-3. 
65 Id. at 154. 
66 Krueger & Perri, supra note 63, at 164. 
67 See Flinn, supra note 62.  
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 2. Incidence Studies 
  
 Economists working in the area of taxation often employ a distinctive approach to 
characterizing inequality: incidence analysis.  Incidence analysis predicts the distribution 
of individual “tax burdens” for a given tax; calculates the individual tax burdens as a 
proportion of individual income; and characterizes the tax as “regressive,” 
“proportional,” or “progressive” if this fractional burden decreases, stays flat, or increases 
with individual income. 
 
 Classically (as in the famous early studies by Joseph Pechman),68 the income 
measure employed in incidence analysis is annual income.69  The conventional wisdom 
that the personal income tax and the corporate income tax are progressive, but that their 
progressive impact is largely offset by the regressive impact of payroll taxes, sales taxes, 
and excise taxes, derives in substantial part from Pechman’s studies.70  Subsequent 
incidence studies sometimes challenged these conclusions, but they almost invariably 
followed Pechman in using the tax burden as a fraction of annual, not lifetime, income as 
the basis for characterizing a tax’s regressivity or progressivity. 
 
 In a 1989 article, James Poterba challenged the annual-income perspective on tax 
incidence.  In line with scholarship in the inequality measurement literature, Poterba took 
the view that, “[i]f households base their spending plans on their expected lifetime 
income, then consumption provides a more accurate measure of lifetime resources than 
does annual income.”71  He examined the Consumer Expenditure Survey, which provides 
data about both household income and household consumption, and assumed (as had 
Pechman) that the burden of an excise tax is borne by the consumer.  Poterba then 
considered the regressivity of excise taxes on gasoline, alcohol, and tobacco.  The typical 
expenditure on each of these items as a percentage of annual income declines steeply.  
From the annual perspective, then, such taxes appear quite regressive.  But the 
expenditure on each of these items as a percentage of total annual expenditure declines 
much less steeply.  From the lifetime-income perspective (with annual consumption taken 
as a proxy for lifetime income), the gasoline, alcohol and tobacco excise taxes appear 
substantially less regressive. 
 
 Since Poterba’s work, some incidence scholarship has taken a lifetime perspective 
by actually estimating lifetime income, rather than taking consumption as a proxy.   For 
example, Erik Caspersen and Gilbert Metcalf used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
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 42
a longitudinal study, to predict lifetime income as a function of various individual 
characteristics.  That function was then applied to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
enabling Caspersen and Metcalf to calculate the burden of the value added tax (VAT) 
both as a fraction of annual income and as a fraction of estimated lifetime income.72  The 
most ambitious work in this vein has been undertaken by Don Fullerton and Diane Lim 
Rogers in their 1993 book, Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden?   They use the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics to estimate wages as a function of age and other 
characteristics, and incorporate these lifetime wage profiles in a general equilibrium 
model. 
  
[The model] encompasses all major U.S. taxes, many industries, ...and consumers.  It is … a life-
cycle model in which each individual receives a particular inheritance, a set of tax rules, a wage 
profile, and a transfer profile. Each then plans an entire lifetime of labor supply, savings, goods 
demands, and bequests.  We also look at each industry’s use of labor, capital, and intermediate 
units.  We can then simulate the effects of a tax change on each economic decision through time. . 
..  
  
 [W]e evaluate the effects of each U.S. tax by comparing its estimated burdens with those 
of a proportional tax. … In our lifetime framework, a progressive tax is one in which the lifetime 
tax burden as a fraction of lifetime income rises as lifetime income rises, and a regressive tax is 
one in which the lifetime tax burden as a fraction of lifetime income falls as lifetime income 
[rises]. 73 
  
 As with the companion literature on income inequality, discussed above, it is the 
clear that the choice of temporal unit makes a difference to incidence analysis.  Every 
study which has compared lifetime and annual perspectives concludes that at least some 
taxes look different from the two perspectives, sometimes quite substantially. 
For example, Poterba, as stated, finds that excise taxes on gasoline, alcohol and tobacco 
are less regressive in a lifetime perspective.  Fullerton and Rogers find that property taxes 
are progressive in an annual perspective but have a U-shaped burden in a lifetime 
perspective; that the corporate income tax shifts from being progressive to being 
regressive; and that the progressivity of the income tax decreases. Caspersen and Metcalf 
find that the VAT is substantially less regressive in the lifetime perspective.   
Davies and co-authors find that the personal income tax is less progressive.74   
 
 3. Health Inequality 
  
 The vast majority of scholarly work that quantifies the degree of inequality in the 
population distribution of some item, with an inequality metric such as the Gini 
coefficient or the coefficient of variation, concerns the distribution of income (annual or 
lifetime).  But the approach is applicable to many other items, and the welfarist would 
surely support its export to other areas.  Income is hardly the sole constituent or resource 
for well-being, nor the sole one which is measurable or unequally distributed.   
  
                                                 
72 See Erik Caspersen & Gilbert Metcalf, Is A Value Added Tax Regressive? Annual Versus Lifetime 
Incidence Measures, 47 NAT’L TAX JOURNAL 731 (1994). 
73 FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 69, at 4-5. 
74 See James Davies et al., Some Calculations of Lifetime Tax Incidence, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 633 (1984).  
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  C.J.L. Murray, a prominent health economist, has indeed argued that inequality 
metrics should be employed to quantify the population distribution of health.75  And there 
is a small, but growing, body of work in this vein. 
 
 What does the lifetime perspective imply for measurement of population health 
inequality?  To begin, it implies that the focus of empirical work should be the 
distribution of lifetime rather than sublifetime health status -- be it momentary health 
status or health status during some longer fraction of a lifetime. 
  
 An analysis by Angus Deaton and Christina Paxon, in the course of a broader 
study on the correlations between age, income, and health, illustrates the momentary 
approach.  The Panel Study on Income Dynamics contains, inter alia, information on 
“self-reported health status.” (SRHS)   Respondents are asked to rate their health on a 
scale from 1 to 5.  SRHS values are a kind of rough proxy for momentary QALYs.76 
Deaton and Paxon calculate the variance in SRHS within age cohorts.77  Although they 
do not do the calculations, it would be straightforward to use the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics data to estimate the population distribution of SRHS and to measure the 
inequality of that distribution.   
 
 From the lifetime perspective, however, such an approach to health-inequality 
measurement is problematic.   For example, imagine that lifespans are increasing in a 
given country but that older individuals have more variance in SRHS, momentary 
QALYs, or some other such measure of momentary health.  Then the distribution of 
lifetime QALYs or some other measure of lifetime health may be becoming more equal, 
even though the distribution of momentary health is not.   Or, imagine that a fatal disease 
increases mortality in a country, and that those who survive are healthier and have less 
variance in momentary health status than the pre-disease population.  Then, if we use a 
momentary inequality metric, it appears that the disease has reduced health inequality.  
                                                 
75 See C.J.L. Murray et al., Health Inequalities and Social Group Differences: What Should We Measure?, 
77 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 537 (1999). Most empirical work on health inequalities focuses, instead, 
on health differences between socioeconomic, racial, or gender groups.  The population approach 
advocated by Murray would seem to be more directly connected to the SWF framework, and thus is my 
focus here.   But measures of social-group differences might also be informative for welfarist social 
planners - a point I discuss below with reference to anti-discrimination and disparate impact tests. See infra 
Part V.C.1.  On the social-group approach to health inequality measurement, see Paula Braveman, Health 
Disparities and Health Equity: Concepts and Measurement, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 167 (2006); 
Murray, supra; Johan P. Mackenbach & Anton E. Kunst, Measuring the Magnitude of Socio-Economic 
Inequalities in Health: An Overview of Available Measures Illustrated with Two Examples from Europe, 44 
SOC. SCI. MED. 757 (1997); Adam Wagstaff & Eddy van Doorslaer, Overall versus Socioeconomic Health 
Inequality: A Measurement Framework and Two Empirical Illustrations, 13 HEALTH ECON. 297 (2004). 
76 QALYs are a widely used metric in health research and, increasingly, government decisionmaking. The 
value of health states is measured on a 0-1 scale, using various survey techniques -- with 1 representing 
perfect health and 0 a health state no better than death -- and the value of a temporally extended health 
profile is the sum of the value of each component state multiplied by its duration.  See generally Matthew 
D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POLICY, L. & ETHICS 1 
(2006). 
77 See Angus S. Deaton & Christina H. Paxon, Aging and Inequality in Income and Health, 88 AM. ECON. 
REV. 248, 250 (1998). 
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What that calculation ignores is the inequality in lifetime health between those who die 
from the disease and those who survive it. 
  
Similar criticisms would apply to inequality measures of the distribution of 
nonmomentary but sublifetime (rather than lifetime) health -- for example, the 
distribution of annual QALYs in a population over the last year. 
 
There are, in fact, health-inequality researchers who have adopted the lifetime 
perspective.  A number of scholars have examined the distribution of longevity.  For 
example, Julian Grand looked at age-at-death statistics from different countries in 
(roughly) the same year.  These statistics show the age at death of everyone who has died 
in the country in that year.   He calculated the Gini coefficient and other inequality 
measures of the age-at-death distribution, for the different countries.78   Ryan D. Edwards 
and Shripad Tuljapurkar compared variance of age-at-death in different countries and at 
different times.79   Similar work has been undertaken by Jacques Silber and by Douglas 
Hicks.80 
 
 All this scholarship employs a crude measure of lifetime health - namely, lifespan.  
Lifetime QALYs would be a better measure of lifetime health.  Indeed, in an important 
paper, Murray and co-authors, E.E. Gakidou and J. Frenk, have proposed using the 
distribution of health expectancy as the basis for studying health inequality; and one of 
the WHO’s annual Health Reports adopts this approach.81  An individual’s health 
expectancy is his expected lifetime health, given his risk of dying at each age, his age-
conditional risk of different health states, and the value of those states on a zero-one 
scale.  In other words, an individual’s health expectancy is just his expected lifetime 
QALYs. 
  
 The Gakidou, Murray and Frenk proposal therefore combines a lifetime 
perspective with the “”ex ante” rather than “ex post” approach to social choice under 
uncertainty.  Part III has criticized the “ex ante” view, and the criticisms are relevant, not 
merely to the Gakidou/Murray/Frenk proposal, but to the enterprise of inequality-
measurement more generally -- as I shall now explain. 
 
 4.    Inequality of Individual Expectations Versus Expected Inequality of 
Attainments 
                                                 
78 See Julian Le Grand, An International Comparison of Distributions of Ages-At-Death, in HEALTH 
INEQUALITIES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 75 (John Fox ed., 1989); Julian Le Grand, Inequalities in Health: 
Some International Comparisons, 31 EUR. ECON. REV. 182 (1987).  See also Raymond Illsley & Julian Le 
Grand, The Measurement of Inequality in Health, in HEALTH AND ECON. 12 (Alan Williams ed., 1987). 
79 Ryan D. Edwards & Shripad Tuljapurkar, Inequality in Life Spans and a New Perspective on Mortality 
Convergence Across Industrialized Countries, 31 POP. & DEVEL. REV. 645 (2005) 
80 See Douglas A. Hicks, The Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index: A Constructive Proposal, 25 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1283 (1997); Jacques Silber, Health and Inequality: Some Applications of 
Uncertainty Theory, 16 SOC. SCI. MED. 1663 (1982). 
81 See E.E. Gakidou et al., Defining and Measuring Health Inequality: An Approach Based on the 
Distribution of Health Expectancy, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 42 (2000); THE WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000, at 146 (2000).  
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 Given some inequality measure M, and some proxy for lifetime well-being X, 
plus uncertainty about individual attainments with respect to X, we can measure the 
inequality of individual expectations or rather the expected inequality of attainments.  We 
can determine the population distribution of individual expectations with respect to X, 
and apply M to that; or we can determined the expected value of M, by applying M to 
each possible population distribution of individual attainments, discounting by the 
probability of that distribution, and summing.  The inequality-of-expectations approach 
maps onto an “ex ante” account of social choice under uncertainty; the expected-
inequality-of-attainments approach maps onto an “ex post” account of social choice 
under uncertainty. 
 
 Gakidou, Murray and Frenk argue for the inequality-of-expectations approach, 
with QALYs as the proxy.  They propose to measure the inequality of expected lifetime 
QALYs, not the expected inequality of lifetime QALYs.  Why? 
 
 One observation they make is that individuals with the same health expectancies 
“may have very different healthy lifespans because of chance.”82  Imagine, at the 
extreme, a birth cohort in which each baby has the same risk of dying at every age, and 
the same age-conditional chance of incurring any health state, regardless of the babies’ 
social classes, ethnicities, genders, or other observable characteristics.  In this sort of 
case, expected lifetime QALYs are perfectly equal within the cohort at the time of birth, 
but the lifetime QALYs actually attained by cohort members will not be equal, “because 
of chance.”  Some members of the cohort will die young; some will not but will suffer 
burdensome diseases; some will live long, healthy lives. But it should hardly be an 
ambition of egalitarian welfarists to ignore differences in well-being that are simply a 
matter of chance.    
 
Gakidou, Murray and Frenk also note that “equality of healthy lifespan could only 
be realized if risks of incidence and remission of non-fatal health outcomes, and risks of 
mortality, were either zero or one for the entire population.”83  Perfect equality of realized 
lifetime QALYs may be impossible -- but so what?  We can still measure the expected 
degree of inequality in lifetime QALYs; and policymakers can still take steps to reduce 
that.  (Parenthetically, perfect equality of expected lifetime QALYs seems just as 
unrealistic as perfect equality of realized lifetime QALYs.) 
 
 A further worry about focusing on the distribution of realized, rather than 
expected, lifetime QALYs is this.  How can we employ that approach to measure future 
health inequality? As described above, scholars such as Le Grand, Edwards and 
Tuljapurkar, Silber, and Hicks have examined age-at-death statistics to determine the 
distribution of realized lifespan in a past population; but, given uncertainty about the 
future, what would it mean to measure the distribution of realized lifespan, or realized 
lifetime QALYs, in a future population?  The answer, here, is that the expected-inequality 
of-attainments framework is robust to uncertainty, for example, uncertainty about what 
                                                 
82 Gakidou et al., supra note 81, at 43. 
83 Gakidou et al., supra note 81, at 44.  
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the health of future cohorts will be.  Indeed, integrating a concern for equality with 
uncertainty is the very point of both this framework as well as the competing equality-of-
expectations approach.  Neither framework assumes certainty, or is merely retrospective. 
We can use current information to estimate the probability of different possible 
population distributions of longevity or lifetime QALYs; measure the degree of 
inequality in each such distribution, for example by using the Gini coefficient; and then 
calculate the expected degree of inequality across possible distributions, for example, the 
expected Gini coefficient of realized longevity or lifetime QALYs. 
 
 The choice between inequality-of-individual-expectations and expected-
inequality-of-attainments has been most clearly highlighted by Gakidou, Murray and 
Frenk, who are health researchers, but scholars working on income inequality must 
confront the same question.  In estimating (say) the Gini coefficient of the inequality of 
lifetime income in some population, should researchers estimate the Gini coefficient of 
expected lifetime income, or the expected Gini coefficient of lifetime income?  Note that 
the question arises most obviously with respect to the prediction of future income 
equality; but it also lurks under the surface of retrospective work, given measurement 
error.  Similarly, lifetime tax-incidence analysis might focus on the expected lifetime tax 
burden as a fraction of expected lifetime income; or on the probability distribution of 
possible incidence scenarios, in each of which individuals at different lifetime income 
levels incur some tax burden. 
 
  
 B. Poverty Measurement 
 
 Poverty measurement, like the companion field of inequality measurement, is a 
large area of research within empirical economics.84  Development economists, in 
particular, have devoted considerable effort to quantifying poverty, but work in the field 
also extends to the United States and other developed countries.  Much existing research 
focuses on income poverty: measuring the extent to which a population is impoverished 
in virtue of its low incomes.  The standard methodology starts by defining a poverty line: 
either an absolute poverty line, often meaning the amount of income required to purchase 
sufficient food to avoid malnutrition; or a relative poverty line, meaning some low 
percentile of the population’s income distribution (for example, the 20th percentile).85  
The poverty index is then some function of the number of individuals below the poverty 
line, their incomes, and the size of the whole population.   Two simple indices are the 
headcount ratio (the fraction of the population which is impoverished); and the poverty 
gap (the average shortfall between the income of each impoverished person and the 
poverty line).  More sophisticated indices are also available.   Measures within the class 
of so-called Foster,Greer, and Thorbecke indices, which take the form 
                                                 
84 See generally BOJER, supra note 55, at 118-22; POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (David B. Grusky & Ravi 
Kanbur eds., 2006); Bhaskar Dutta, Inequality, Poverty and Welfare, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE 
AND WELFARE 597, 619-27 (2002);Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi et al., Does It Matter that We Do Not Agree 
on the Definition of Poverty? A Comparison of Four Approaches, 31 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 243 (2003). 
85 See sources cited supra note 84; Martin Ravallion, Poverty Lines in Theory and Practice (The World 
Bank, LSMS Working Paper No. 133, 1998). 
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1/N∑ [(Z-Xi)/Z]α, α ≥0, with Xi the individual’s income and Z the poverty line, are most 
commonly used.86  
 
 What are the implications, here, of lifetime welfarism?  As suggested earlier, the 
lifetime view might be seen to undermine the variant of equity-regarding welfarism -- 
sufficientism -- which most directly supports the practice of poverty measurement.87  
Lifetime sufficientism would be defined around a single threshold level of lifetime well-
being that would make a categorical difference with respect to redistributive claims.   
Identifying that lifetime level is not an easy matter.  Consider the criterion of being well-
nourished -- the typical basis in practice for setting absolute poverty lines.  Someone who 
is badly nourished at all moments throughout a lifetime is impoverished with respect to 
lifetime well-being -- but this sets the poverty threshold extremely low, and makes 
sufficientism collapse to utilitarianism for the vast majority of the population.   At the 
other extreme, the fact that an individual is hungry once in her life can hardly mean that 
she falls in the class of lifetime “poor” individuals who have stronger redistributive 
claims on the rest of the population.  And any cutoff percentage Q which is greater than 0 
and less than 1, which purports to define the percentage of moments that an individual 
must be malnourished to be lifetime malnourished, may well seem arbitrary -- arbitrary in 
a way that the basic notion of being malnourished is not. 
     
 In short, the lifetime view may radically change the theoretical basis for the field 
of poverty measurement.  This is not to say that the field would disappear.  Poverty 
measures can provide important information for utilitarians, prioritarians, and 
comparativists, not just for sufficientists.  For example, an income-poverty line might 
track qualitative changes in the welfare productivity of money.  The marginal utility of 
income might decrease dramatically at the point at which income suffices to purchase 
basic nourishment.  But abandoning sufficientism would mean that poverty measurement 
would need to locate some other philosophical justification within welfarism, and in 
particular that the poverty line could not be set with reference to some morally basic cut-
off level of well-being.  Giving up sufficientism means giving up that notion.  
  
 Still, it is possible to marry sufficientism with the lifetime perspective on well-
being.  As mentioned earlier, Roger Crisp, a leading proponent of sufficientism, 
entertains just this possibility.88 Poverty measurement rooted in lifetime sufficientism 
would naturally be focused on the distribution of lifetime income in some population (or 
the distribution of some proxy for lifetime income) and a poverty line defined in terms of 
lifetime income (or some proxy). 
 
 This is not a utopian idea.   Poverty researchers, like inequality researchers, 
generally employ short-term measures of income; but, as in the inequality field, there 
actually is a reasonably substantial body of scholarship that attempts to take a longer-
term view.   The rubric for this work is the study of “chronic” rather than “transient” 
                                                 
86  See Udo Ebert & Patrick Moyes, A Simple Axiomatization of the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke Poverty 
Orderings, 4 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 455, 456 (2002).   
87 See supra Part II.B.3. 
88See id.. 
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poverty.89   Much of this research employs longitudinal data, with chronic poverty 
defined either in terms of multi-period income (or consumption), or in terms of the 
frequency with the individual is below the periodic income (or consumption) poverty 
line.  For example, Jyotsana Jalan and Martin Ravallion examined panel data over six 
years from China, which provided information about a household’s consumption and 
other characteristics.90  They defined a household’s chronic poverty to be the squared 
poverty gap between its mean consumption over the six years and the annual poverty 
line. Since annual consumption was normalized by the annual poverty line, this is the 
same as taking the squared poverty gap between a household’s normalized six-year 
consumption and a six-year poverty line equaling six times the annual poverty line.  Jalan 
and Ravallion also calculated “transient” poverty, defined as the difference between the 
household’s average squared poverty gap and its chronic poverty.  Raghav Gaiha and 
Anil Deolalikar used panel data from India over 9 years, and determined whether the 
household was below the annual income poverty line for zero, one, or more years.   Some 
households, the most “persistently” poor, had annual incomes below that line for all nine 
years.91  
 
 A different approach, again paralleling inequality-measurement techniques, is to 
employ a proxy for long-term poverty.  For example, the depth of poverty in one period 
might be taken as a crude measure of whether the household’s long-term income is above 
or below some long-term line.92  Or annual consumption might be used.  Slesnick 
examined not only consumption inequality in the U.S., but consumption poverty as 
well93; and Krishna Pendakur examined consumption poverty in Canada.94 
 
 If individuals’ annual incomes were completely immobile, annual income would 
be no worse an indicator of lifetime well-being than lifetime or long-term income, and 
poverty studies could use a long- or short-term income time slice interchangeably.  The 
immobility premise is, of course, false, and studies of chronic poverty therefore reach 
distinctive conclusions: about the extent of poverty, its causes and correlates, and policy 
responses.   For example, Javan and Ravllion find that the amount of poverty would be 
reduced by half if transient poverty were excluded; that one of the four Chinese provinces 
studied had a much higher proportion of transient poverty than the others; and that, when 
a household’s chronic and transient poverty were regressed on household characteristics, 
the determinants of the two were quite different.  Slesnick, in the U.S. context, finds that 
the percentage of the population suffering consumption poverty is substantially lower 
than the percentage that are counted as impoverished using traditional annual-income 
                                                 
89 For overviews, see David Hulme & Andrew Shepherd, Conceptualizing Chronic Poverty, 31 WORLD 
DEV. 403 (2003); Andrew McKay & David Lawson, Assessing the Extent and Nature of Chronic Poverty 
in Low Income Countries: Issues and Evidence, 31 WORLD DEV. 425 (2003).  
90 See Jyotsana Jalan & Martin Ravallion, Is Transient Poverty Different? Evidence for Rural China, 36 J. 
DEVELOPMENT STUD. 82 (2000). 
91 Raghav Gaiha & Anil B. Deolalikar, Persistent, Expected and Innate Poverty: Estimates for Semi-Arid 
Rural South India, 1975-1984, 17 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON, 409 (1993).  
92See McKay & Lawson, supra note 89, at 434. 
93 See SLESNICK, supra note 63, at 156-89. 
94 See Krishna Pendakur, Consumption Poverty in Canada, 1969 to 1998, 27 CANADIAN PUB. POLICY 125 
(2001). 
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measures, and that consumption poverty (by contrast with the traditional measure) has 
decreased over time. 
 
More generally, the picture from multiple studies suggests that: 
 
 [C]hronic poverty … is strongly associated with disadvantages that are difficult to 
reverse quickly such as a lack of assets (physical and human ….), being trapped in low-
productivity activities …, a high dependency ratio[], and location in remote or otherwise 
disadvantaged areas.  Transient poverty by contrast is more typically associated with cases where 
households have very little ability to insure themselves against fluctuations due to either external 
factors such as prices, climate or job availability, or household level shocks such as serious illness 
or death.95 
 
As for policy implications, the literature on chronic poverty suggests – very crudely – 
that government policies such as unemployment insurance, good health care coverage, 
worker retraining, or disaster relief, will be applauded by the sublifetime sufficientist, but 
will be viewed more skeptically by the lifetime sufficientist.  These policies may help 
many whose short-term well-being is episodically low, without doing much for the badly 
educated, socially isolated, and low-asset portion of the population whose long-term 
well-being is low.   
 
I have, until now, bracketed issues of uncertainty -- but those must inevitably be 
confronted by poverty researchers, as in the companion field of inequality measurement. 
Given some proxy for lifetime well-being X (such as lifetime income), some poverty line 
Z, and some poverty measure M, we might calculate M as a function of Z and individual 
expectations with respect to X; or, alternatively, we might calculate the expectation of M, 
that is, the expected degree to which individuals’ actual attainments with respect to X fall 
short of Z. The first approach corresponds to the “ex ante” account of social choice under 
uncertainty; the second, to the “ex post” approach.   A number of researchers have taken 
the first approach.   For example, Gaiha and Deolalikar inter alia employ a regression 
model to determine the household’s expected income, and calculate poverty as a function 
of household expected income.96 But it would be better -- if the “ex post” account is 
correct -- to try to estimate the probability of different possible distributions of long-term 
income in the population of interest, and then to calculate the expected degree of poverty 
as a probability-weighted average of the poverty measure applied to each of these 
possible income distributions.97 
 
  
                                                 
95 McKay & Lawson, supra note 89, at 436-37.  
96 See Gaiha & Delolalikar, supra note 91.  
97There is a general point to be noted about the deviation between “ex ante” and “ex post” approaches to 
implementing an SWF or to measuring inequality or poverty.  Let V1 … Vn be random variables 
representing individual attainments (either utilities or income levels).   F is a function of these (such as a 
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function of the Vi.  See Adler and Sanchirico, supra note 7. Since this is not true for equity-regarding 
SWFs, inequality measures, or poverty measures, the “ex ante” and “ex post” approaches will deviate in all 
three cases. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIFETIME VIEW: CHOOSING POLICIES 
 
 Here, I discuss the implications of lifetime equity-regarding welfarism for policy 
choice.  Rather than discussing the implications in particular policy domains (education, 
environmental law, health care, natural hazards, unemployment insurance, etc.), which 
would consume many articles, I approach the issue in a more general way. First, I look at 
the implications for redistributive taxation.  The credentials of the tax system, as a 
redistributive mechanism, are unimpeachable.  Then, I examine the implications for the 
well-known view, pressed by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell and others, that the tax 
system is the sole legal mechanism appropriately employed for redistribution, regardless 
of the SWF.  Finally (because there are plausible grounds to dispute this view), I examine 
the implications for the policy-analytic tools we might use to evaluate the equity effects 
of non-tax policies: in particular, “suspect class” analysis and the development of 
integrated policy-analytic tools that will be sensitive to both overall well-being and 
equity. 
  
 A. Redistributive Taxes 
 
 Debates about the appropriate tax structure, for example the long-running debate 
about consumption versus income taxation, are commonplace both in various scholarly 
fields and in the political process.  Equity-regarding welfarism suggests that the first-best 
technique for choosing among tax regimes is by specifying a SWF, or range of SWFs, 
and comparing possible regimes in light of this function(s).  The traditional criteria for 
evaluating tax policy, such as “horizontal equity” or “vertical equity” or “ability to pay,” 
are second-best, proxy criteria, which are justifiably employed in some contexts given the 
computational demands of the first-best technique.98  The choice between sublifetime and 
lifetime perspectives has direct relevance, both to the proxy criteria and to first-best 
policy evaluation by application of a SWF. 
 
 Start with the proxy criteria.  Horizontal equity means equal tax burdens for 
similarly situated individuals. Vertical equity means different tax burdens for differently 
situated individuals.  A standard way to define an individual’s “situation,” for purposes of 
these criteria, is in terms of her income.  This makes sense, for welfarists, given the role 
of income as an important determinant of well-being.  Horizontal equity then requires 
that individuals with equal incomes bear equal tax burdens, and vertical equity that 
individuals with greater incomes pay more tax (at least in absolute and perhaps fractional 
terms) -- since the utilitarian and, a fortiori, the equity-regarding welfarist will favor 
some transfers of income (bracketing disincentive effects) from rich to poor.  Adopting a 
lifetime view of well-being, in turn, motivates a definition of horizontal and vertical 
equity in terms of lifetime income rather than sublifetime well-being. As Fullerton and 
Rogers explain, “[T]he lifetime perspective provides a useful yardstick to help evaluate 
any … tax system.  For ‘horizontal equity,’ two individuals with similar lifetime incomes 
                                                 
98 For critiques of these traditional criteria as first-best criteria, see LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF 
TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS ch. 15 (forthcoming 2007); Thomas D. Griffith, Should “Tax Norms” 
Be Abandoned: Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WIS. 
L. REV. 1115. 
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should pay similar total lifetime taxes.  In addition, for ‘vertical equity,’ higher lifetime 
incomes should be associated with higher lifetime tax burdens.99” 
 
 The temporal framing of horizontal and vertical equity norms clearly affects 
whether particular regimes are seen as more or less “equitable” in light of these norms.  
Consider the most obvious example: William Vickrey’s well-known proposal for 
cumulative income taxation.100  
 
A cumulative tax system consists of a final tax schedule that specifies total tax payments and of 
procedures for collecting tax payments along the way . . . Vickrey proposed that the final tax 
schedule be derived from the existing annual tax schedule by calculating for any total income the 
tax that would have been paid under the annual tax schedule if the total income had been earned in 
equal amounts in each of the years of the averaging period.   Total income was to be calculated as 
the sum of annual taxable income over the averaging period plus an imputation of accumulated 
interest on tax payments made through the averaging period.101   
 
Making the averaging period an entire lifetime is what horizontal equity, framed in terms 
of equal taxation for individuals with equal lifetime incomes, would require.102  Under 
the current income tax system in the U.S., which uses an annual period for measuring 
income and increasing rather than constant marginal rates, two individuals with identical 
lifetime incomes can readily pay different lifetime taxes depending on the temporal 
pattern of income.   A very simple example103: Imagine that the marginal tax rates are 
10% for the first $30,000 of income and 30% for income thereafter. A and B live for two 
years.  A has a fluctuating income and earns $10,000 in the first year and $90,000 in the 
next, while B has a constant income and earns $50,000 in both years.  Then A will owe 
$1,000 in taxes in the first year and $21,000 in the second, for a total of $22,000, while B 
will owe $9,000 in taxes in each year, for a total of $18,000.   A therefore owes more in 
total taxes than B, even though both have identical lifetime incomes.  From an annual 
perspective, horizontal equity framed in income terms is simply inapplicable to A and B -
- who have different incomes in both years -- but from a lifetime perspective the 
differential treatment of A and B appears arbitrary.  As Vickrey explained, “no taxpayer 
should bear a heavier or lighter burden merely because certain items of his income 
happen to be earned or realized in one year or another …”104 Vickrey’s system ensures 
that individuals with equal total lifetime incomes will pay an equal present value of taxes. 
   
 Specifying the horizontal-income-equity norm in terms of lifetime rather than 
annual income would also argue for adopting Vickrey-like averaging mechanisms for any 
                                                 
99 FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 69, at 19.  
100 See William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. ECON. 379 (1939); 
WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 164-97 (1947); William Vickrey, Cumulative 
Averaging After Thirty Years, in MODERN FISCAL ISSUES 117 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head eds., 
1972). 
101 Jeffrey B. Liebman, Should Taxes Be Based on Lifetime Income? Vickrey Taxation Revisited (John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, December 2003), at 6. 
102 On the horizontal-equity argument for Vickrey’s and similar proposals, see Kirk J. Stark & Lee Anne 
Fennell, Taxation over Time 22-27 (UCLA Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-24, Sept. 6, 2005), 
at 22-27; Daniel Shaviro, Permanent Income and the Annual Income Tax, at 9-10. 
103 This example is taken from Fennell and Stark, supra note 102, at 23-24. 
104 Vickrey, Averaging of Income, supra note 100, at 381. 
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income-based tax or transfer program. Lily Batchelder argues for multi-year averaging in 
calculating the Earned Income Tax Credit.105  Jeffrey Liebman notes that workers with 
identical lifetime earnings can pay different amounts of Social Security Tax, which is a 
constant percentage but has a cap.106  A pure welfare program, designed just to alleviate 
poverty -- understood in lifetime rather than annual terms -- might well key annual 
payments to cumulative income, not annual income. 107   
 
A lifetime-income specification of traditional horizontal- or vertical-equity tax 
norms not only strengthens the case for Vickrey-style income-averaging structures, which 
in actual practice have been rarely adopted.108  That specification may also change how 
commonplace tax structures are evaluated in light of horizontal or vertical equity norms.  
Indeed, the main function of lifetime-incidence studies of tax structures is to inform such 
evaluation. As Fullerton and Rogers explain: 
 
A misconception here is that the lifetime perspective mandates lifetime accounting to calculate 
current tax liability.   Not so. Tax collections can still be based on annual accounts.  But the 
lifetime perspective provides a useful yardstick to help evaluate any such tax system.109 
  
Consider the choice between the VAT and the existing income tax.  The VAT is 
regressive in terms of annual income, while the existing income tax is progressive. The 
VAT is substantially less regressive in terms of lifetime income, while the existing 
income tax is less progressive.  So the “vertical equity” argument for the existing income 
tax, over the VAT, weakens when we take the position that individuals are differently 
situated for purposes of “vertical equity” when they have different lifetime (not annual) 
incomes. 
 
 To be sure, for egalitarian welfarists, the proxy criteria are just that -- rough 
indices that economize on evaluation costs but can also produce errors.   Individuals with 
equal lifetime incomes will not necessarily have equal lifetime utilities.  In particular -- a 
point stressed by the scholarly literature on Vickrey’s proposal110 --  individuals with 
equal lifetime income may end up with different consumption sequences (pace classic 
economic wisdom) and therefore different levels of lifetime well-being.   One response is 
to rework the notions of horizontal and vertical equity, defining them in terms of some 
function of consumption rather than income.  Another is to move to first-best analysis.  In 
fact, tax-policy scholarship is one area where policy proposals are regularly evaluated 
through the application of a SWF.  The practice of doing so goes back to Mirlees’ work, 
                                                 
105 See Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 395 
(2003). 
106 Liebman, supra note 101, at  4 
107 Shaviro, supra note 102, 15-16. For helpful general discussions of income averaging, see id.; Stark & 
Fennell, supra note 102. 
108 A different set of esoteric structures, which may also be better than the straight income tax at equalizing 
lifetime income, are age-related taxes.  See Stark & Fennell, supra note 102. 
109 FULLERTON & ROGERS, supra note 69, at 19. 
110 See Stark & Fennell, supra note 102; Shaviro, supra note 102; Liebman, supra note 101. 
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on optimal taxation.111  In this context, the lifetime perspective counsels -- of course - 
that the SWF be defined as a function of lifetime utilities.  
 
Some optimal-tax scholarship does exactly this.  For example, Jeffrey Liebman 
studied a version of Vickrey’s income-averaging proposal.112  He assumes a population 
of three types of individuals, with steady, declining, or rising earnings over time.  The 
individuals, in one scenario, smooth their consumption; in the other, they are “present 
focused” and consume the earnings when realized.   Given a utilitarian SWF, Vickrey 
taxation is always better than an annual income tax in the smoothing scenario; whether it 
is in the “present-focused” scenario depends on the proportion of the three types of 
individuals.  Liebman, then, compares the two tax structures using an equity-regarding 
SWF that depends on the lifetime utilities of the three types of individuals.   The specific 
results depend on the parameters of the SWF but -- as it turns out -- tend to be similar to 
the utilitarian case.   These conclusions about the effect of Vickrey averaging may or may 
not hold up with further analysis; my point, here, is to endorse Liebman’s lifetime-
focused methodology for optimal-tax modeling. 
 
 B. Should Non-Tax Instruments be Used for Redistribution? 
  
 Kaplow and Shavell have published a series of influential articles arguing that the 
income tax system rather than non-tax legal rules, such as tort doctrines, should be used 
to redistribute income.113  Their work is closely related to a body of scholarship in 
applied economics which argues against the use of “distributive weights” in cost-benefit 
analysis.114  
  
 An important analytic step in this work, certainly in Kaplow and Shavell’s, 
involves Pareto-superiority.  Imagine that a government decisionmaker is considering 
two non-tax policy options, PEquity and PK-H.   The two options could, for example, be 
different sets of legal doctrines, or different regulations, or different expenditures on 
public goods.  The decisionmaker has in hand an equity-regarding SWF, which favors 
PEquity. But PK-H is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to PEquity: those who benefit from PK-H 
could compensate those who are made worse off, via costless lump-sum transfers, 
making everyone better off than with PEquity. 
 
 What is the argument for choosing PK-H?  One line of argument is not persuasive: 
namely that PK-H, coupled with perfect redistributive taxation, is a Pareto improvement 
relative to PEquity.  By “perfect redistributive taxation,” I mean just a system of costless 
lump-sum transfers -- one that has zero administrative costs and has no effect on 
                                                 
111 See James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 175 (1971).  
112 See Liebman, supra note 101. 
113 See in particular Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency 
vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income 
Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981).   
114 See Olof Johansson-Stenman, Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis--Should We Forget About 
Them?, 81 LAND ECON. 337, 338-39 (2005) (citing sources). 
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individuals’ welfare except to increase or decrease their holdings by the amount taxed or 
granted. The problem with this argument is that the actual tax system is imperfect, given 
administrative costs and hidden information.    
 
Kaplow’s and Shavell’s contribution was to show that, in a class of cases, PK-H, 
coupled with a kind of imperfect taxation, will be Pareto-superior to PEquity.  They focus 
on the income tax -- which is imperfect because it creates a disincentive to work.  They 
show that, under certain conditions, where a legal rule is Kaldor-Hicks inefficient, the 
adoption of an efficient alternative together with matching changes in income tax rates 
will leave work incentives unchanged and raise a surplus -- which can be distributed in 
lump-sum form, making everyone better off than with the inefficient rule.  
 
 For their result to go through, Kaplow and Shavell have to assume that income, 
labor effort, and other characteristics enter into individual utility functions in a particular 
way.  The debate, within legal scholarship, about their argument has largely focused on 
these assumptions.115  The question, in effect, is about the conditions under which a 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy can be converted into a Pareto-superior policy.   
 
I want to come at the issue from a different direction.  The lifetime perspective 
clarifies the kind of Pareto-superiority that arguments such as Kaplow and Shavell’s need 
to establish.  
 
 The crucial point to see is that the four different variants of equity-regarding 
welfarism, defined by different answers to the time-slice problem and different views of 
how social welfare functions should be applied under conditions of uncertainty, generate 
four corresponding -- and distinct -- senses of Pareto-superiority.   
   
     
Different Variants of Pareto Superiority Corresponding to Different 
Variants of Equity-Regarding Welfarism  
 
     What is the Correct Approach to 
     Social Choice Under Uncertainty?  
     
     Ex Ante   Ex Post  
  
 What is the  Sublifetime EA-S (Ex Ante  EP-S (Ex Post 
 Correct Time    Sublifetime)   Sublifetime) 
 Slice?    Pareto Superiority Pareto Superiority 
     
 
   Lifetime  EA-L (Ex Ante   EP-L (Ex Post  
     Lifetime)  Lifetime) 
     Pareto Superiority Pareto Superiority 
                                                 
115 See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 
(2001); Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: 
A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125 (2004). See also Johansson-Stenman, supra note 
114. 
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In particular, if one adopts the view argued for here -- the combination of lifetime 
welfarism and an “ex post” approach to social choice under uncertainty -- the matching 
sort of Pareto superiority is ex post, lifetime Pareto superiority.    For short, let’s call this 
EP-L Pareto superiority. A policy P* is EP-L Pareto superior to alternative P if, in every 
state of the world, at least some individuals would have greater lifetime well-being if P* 
were chosen than they would if P were chosen, and no individual would have lower 
lifetime well-being if P* were chosen. 
  
 Along the temporal dimension, EP-L Pareto superiority is a relaxed notion of 
Pareto superiority.   EP-sublifetime Pareto-superiority is more stringent.  To see this 
point, consider any lifetime view that ascribes sublifetime as well as lifetime utilities.116   
Let us bracket uncertainty for the moment, and imagine that we have two, certain 
outcomes O and O*, and various individuals.  In some periods (e.g., some years), some 
individuals are worse off in O* than in O.  However, no one has lower lifetime well-
being in O*, and some have higher lifetime well-being.   Sublifetime welfarists who 
accept the basic intuition of the Pareto principle can deny that O* is better than O.  
Paretian sublifetime welfarists would say that O* is Pareto superior to O only if, in every 
period, no individual is worse off in O* and some are better off.  But lifetime welfarists 
surely cannot construe the Pareto principle so stringently.   Lifetime welfarists think of 
well-being as an attribute of a whole human life.  Paretians find it hard to see how an 
outcome that makes everyone better off could be a worse outcome.   Lifetime welfarists 
might deny the Pareto principle; what is very hard to see is why they would accept it but 
insist on Pareto superiority in each period taken individually.  In short, lifetime welfarists 
must count O* as a Pareto improvement over O -- in accordance with the EP-L construal 
of Pareto superiority. 
 
 Genuine Pareto improvements are therefore easier to secure for lifetime welfarists 
than for sublifetime welfarists.   If one outcome produces greater sublifetime well-being 
for some, and no less for anyone, in every period, then it surely is Pareto superior in 
terms of lifetime well-being; but an outcome can be Pareto superior in terms of lifetime 
well-being without being Pareto superior in each period, as in the example just discussed. 
   
Along the dimension of uncertainty, by contrast, EP-L Pareto superiority is a 
stringent notion of Pareto superiority.  EP-L Pareto superiority demands that policy P* be 
a Pareto-improvement over P in every possible state of the world.  I am relying, here, on 
Savage’s classic framework for formalizing choice under uncertainty.  The 
decisionmaker expresses her uncertainty as a probability assignment to a set of possible 
states (where a “state” might be understood as a completely prior history of the world 
plus a set of possible causal laws).  Each possible action is a mapping which assigns an 
outcome to each possible state.  EP-L Pareto superiority requires that, for each possible 
state, the outcome that would occur if P* were chosen be a Pareto improvement over the 
outcome that would occur if P were chosen.  In each state, some individuals must have 
greater lifetime well-being in the outcome that results from P*, and none may have lower 
lifetime well-being. 
                                                 
116 As mentioned earlier, not all lifetime views do this. 
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 Why EP-L Pareto superiority?  Why not ex ante-lifetime Pareto superiority (EA-L 
dominance), which says that P* is Pareto-superior to P if some have greater expected 
lifetime well-being with P* and none have lower expected lifetime well-being?    If P* is 
EP-L Pareto-superior to P, then any SWF which respects the Pareto principle in its 
ranking of outcomes, and is applied in accordance with the correct account of choice 
under uncertainty -- the ex post account-- will prefer P* to P.    By contrast, EA-L Pareto 
superiority doesn’t guarantee that.  Indeed, in our work on choice under uncertainty, 
Sanchirico and I highlight a stronger and counterintuitive result:  For any continuous 
SWF which respects the Pareto principle in its ranking of outcomes and the Pigou-Dalton 
principle, there will be at least one pair of policies P+ and P++ such that P+ is EA-L 
Pareto superior to P++ but P++ is actually preferred by the SWF, if applied in accordance 
with the ex post approach, to P+.117   
  
 Return, now, to the question of using tax versus non-tax instruments to engage in 
redistribution.   Those who argue that policymakers in some non-tax domain should 
ignore distributive considerations, and assert -- as do Kaplow and Shavell -- that this 
claim holds true regardless of the form of the SWF, must show that efficient policies in 
the domain can be converted, via the stipulated tax instrument, into EP-L Pareto-superior 
policies.  Unless they can make that showing, the assertion that any Paretian equity-
regarding SWF will prefer the efficient policy together with compensating tax changes 
will be untrue. 
 
 For a dramatic illustration of the point, consider risk regulation.  Imagine that 
everyone in a reasonably large group of individuals is at risk of dying from a pollutant, a 
workplace hazard, a dangerous product, or some other risk source.  A policy P prevents 
some premature deaths in the group, at some cost in consumption both to group members 
and nonmembers.  Our equity-regarding SWF prefers P to a less interventionist policy 
P*.  However, because the choice of P* simply increases the risk of death for group 
members, it is quite possible that P* is ex ante Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to P.   P* 
reduces each group member’s expected lifetime well-being by some amount (by 
increasing the fatality risks to which group members are subject); P* increases the 
expected well-being of non-members by some amount (by increasing their consumption); 
and it is quite possible that there is a costless lump-sum redistribution of money, from 
group nonmembers to group members, such that P* coupled with this redistribution 
increases everyone’s expected well-being as compared to P.    
 
Imagine that our income tax system, despite its imperfections, is good enough to 
actually accomplish ex ante Paretian redistribution.  P*, together with income tax 
adjustments, is EA-L Pareto-superior to P.  It doesn’t follow that P* is EP-L Pareto-
superior to P. After all, some group members will die prematurely as a result of P*.    All 
                                                 
117 See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 7, at 331-34.  This result may not hold for all equity-regarding 
SWFs in the broader sense employed in this Article, but that does not affect my analysis of the Kaplow and 
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group members receive tax transfers such that the expected increase in each member’s 
utility produced by the transfer exceeds the expected loss in his utility associated with his 
higher fatality risk.   But, in any state of the world in which some group member dies 
earlier as a result of P*, he loses the entire utility difference between full life and 
premature death, and gains only the transfer.  In that state, he might well be worse off as 
a result of P*-plus-transfer.  Indeed, if the deaths at issue are instantaneous -- so that the 
transfer occurs after his death -- he will surely be worse off than if policy P had been 
implemented.    So it is not, in fact, guaranteed that every equity-regarding SWF, if 
applied in an ex post manner, will prefer P*-plus-transfer to P.   In some states, 
individuals are worse off (those who die prematurely) and inequality may be widened 
(between them and everyone else). 
 
 It might be objected that a sufficiently well-functioning tax system could convert 
an efficient policy that imposes an increased risk of death on some group into an EP-L 
Pareto-superior policy. But such a system would be fantastical: it would have to sort 
within the group, identifying those who actually will die in a given state, and targeting 
payments to them in that state (payments that must occur sufficiently long before they die 
to compensate for premature death).   
 
 To conclude, I should stress that this Section does not show that non-tax 
instruments should in fact be used for redistribution.  It may be true that, with a particular 
SWF or family of SWFs in hand, we can show why policy choices in some domain 
should be made with reference to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, leaving distributive 
considerations to the tax system.  But Kaplow and Shavell offer a different argument 
against non-tax redistribution, one that can apply to all equity-regarding SWFs (more 
precisely, all that accept the Pareto principle for outcomes) because the argument invokes 
Pareto superiority. The thrust of this Section is to clarify the requisite structure of this sort 
of argument. 
 
C. Distributively Sensitive Policy Analysis 
 
1.  Anti-Discrimination Norms, Disparate Impact Tests,  and Protected 
Classes 
  
 Public law in the U.S. employs anti-discrimination norms and, to a lesser extent, 
disparate impact tests to constrain governmental policy choices. An anti-discrimination 
norm covers policies that facially refer to, or are designed to injure, certain suspect 
groups, subjecting such policies to a heightened burden of justification.  The Equal 
Protection Clause protects racial minorities and women via an anti-discrimination norm.  
A disparate impact test demands heightened justification for nondiscriminatory laws that 
disproportionately harm members of a suspect class, as opposed to nonmembers.  Under 
current doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause does not proscribe disparate impact. 
However, various nonconstitutional sources of law ground disparate impact tests 
applicable to governmental actors -- for example, Title VI, or Executive Order 12898 -- 
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and measuring disparate impact with respect to racial minorities and low-income groups 
is a key focus of the literature on “environmental justice.” 118   
 
 Discrimination norms and disparate impacts test are -- for the equity-regarding 
welfarist --  the non-tax analogues of notions of horizontal and vertical equity.  They are 
proxy tests.  “Suspect” or “protected” classes are groups of individuals who tend to be 
badly off with respect to well-being; policies that widen the welfare gap between them 
and the rest of society, either through explicit discrimination or disparate impact, are 
likely to be rejected by any sensible SWF absent a sufficient countervailing gain to 
overall welfare. 
 
 What are the implications of lifetime welfarism for anti-discrimination and 
disparate impact tests?   To begin, it should be noted that the shift from a sublifetime to a 
lifetime framework does not substantially change the case for recognizing race and 
gender as suspect classifications.  In a society where law or social norms stigmatize 
blacks as second-class citizens, or one where such norms have evaporated but existed in 
the recent past, the status of racial minority correlates with a lower level of both 
sublifetime and lifetime well-being.   A similar account can be given with respect to 
gender.  
 
 Lifetime welfarism does affect the meaning of low-income status, for purposes of 
environmental-justice measures or other tests that recognize low-income groups as 
“suspect.” Bracketing measurement costs, the best specification of the low-income class 
looks to lifetime, not temporal income.  Indeed, in the empirical literature that tries to 
quantify disparate impact along an income gradient, some of the newer work focuses on 
lifetime income.119 
 
 Let us turn, now, to the status of age as a protected class -- for it is here that 
lifetime and sublifetime welfarism diverge most dramatically.  Within sublifetime 
welfarism, the case for viewing age as a protected class is strong.  Age correlates with 
lower levels of momentary well-being, once age is sufficiently advanced.  Certainly it is 
plausible that (say) 80-year olds tend to have a lower level of momentary well-being than 
35-year olds: because of health problems, lower incomes, and social isolation.  So 
redistributing health care or income from the 80-year to the 35-year old is, from a 
momentary perspective, a transfer from badly off to better off. 
 
 By contrast, from the lifetime perspective, age should not be a suspect class.  The 
average lifetime well-being of 80-year-olds is greater than the average lifetime well-
being of 35-year olds -- since the 80-year-olds will end up living longer, on average, than 
the 35-year-olds. 
 
                                                 
118 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1423-26 (2003). 
119 See Tom Van Ourti, Socio-economic Inequality in Ill-Health Amongst the Elderly: Should One Use 
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 So what is the relevant suspect class? Youth?  Will the lifetime welfarist view 
policies that discriminate against older individuals as a kind of affirmative action for the 
young?  Some lifetime welfarists have actually defended this position.120 To see why the 
position is incorrect, or at least much too crude, it is important to remember that lifetime 
welfarism should be married with an ex post, rather than ex ante, approach to social 
choice under uncertainty. 
 
 Consider a policy that imposes a tax on 80-year-olds to benefit 35-year-olds.   
Some of the 35-year-olds will live to be 80; some will die before 80, but live to 
experience many years of adulthood; a small fraction will die only a few years after 
reaching 35.  Call these subgroups of the 35-year-olds subgroups A, B, and C.    The 
policy (if kept in place permanently) simply shifts resources within the lives of the 
individuals in subgroup A, and may well harm rather than benefit them by doing so.   
Many individuals who live to advanced ages have a lifetime health and consumption 
profile that could be improved by shifting resources to later in life; the policy, in its effect 
on subgroup A, works in the opposite direction.   Subgroup B is benefited by the policy 
(bracketing incentive effects), because they reap its benefits but will never live to be 
subject to the tax.   Yet the individuals in subgroup B will have reasonably long lives.   
Shifting resources from the 80-year-olds to them may not be counted -- depending on the 
shape of the SWF -- as a large improvement in social welfare.  It is a redistribution from 
the rich (in terms of lifetime well-being) to the merely prosperous.   
  
 In transferring resources from the 80-year-olds to subgroup C, the policy does 
work a clear redistributive benefit.  But subgroup C may be only a small fraction of the 
total group of 35-year olds.  The redistributive benefit of shrinking the gap between their 
lifetime well-being, and that of the 80-year olds, may not justify the overall costs of the 
policy -- administrative costs, reduced lifetime well-being of current 80 year olds, and 
reduced lifetime well-being of the 35-year olds who will live to be 80. 
 
 So, from the lifetime perspective, age is not a good candidate for a suspect class, 
but neither is youth -- at least in a society like the U.S. where many of the young will end 
up becoming fairly old.  Within lifetime welfarism, the characteristic that generates 
redistributive claims is lifetime well-being; the lower the individual’s level of lifetime 
well-being, the stronger her redistributive claim. Since neither the attribute of being old, 
nor the attribute of being young, is strongly correlated with having a low level of lifetime 
well-being, neither the old nor the young should be a “suspect” class for purposes of 
proxy tests that roughly implement lifetime welfarism. 
 
 A better candidate for “suspect” status -- odd as this may sound -- is lifespan.  
Longevity is not, of course, the sole determinant of lifetime well-being.  Individuals with 
equal lifespans can surely end up at different lifetime welfare levels, if the experiential, 
health, or social components of their lives are different.  Longevity is simply one 
dimension of well-being.  But longevity has the special property of being, not just a 
dimension of well-being, but a precondition as well.  Dead individuals don’t have social 
lives, pleasant experiences, meaningful careers, and so on.   This strengthens the case for 
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thinking of the attribute of having a short lifespan as “suspect.”  However much 
happiness and love is jammed into a life that ends at age five, that unfortunate child will 
end up much worse off in terms of lifetime flourishing than most others in her society.  
Those at the bottom of the lifespan distribution are a kind of impoverished group, 
analogous in this respect to those at the bottom of the (lifetime) income distribution, or 
those who bear the lifetime burden of being socially stigmatized as second-class citizens. 
 
 Should legal doctrine actually recognize the short-lifespanned as “suspect” for 
purposes of equality tests?  That proposal is less outrageous than it may seem at first 
blush.  Explicit discrimination against the short-lifespanned does not, of course, occur.  
But policies can have a disparate impact on them -- most obviously, policies that increase 
juvenile mortality. (Consider a policy to terminate funding for some health care measure 
targeted at a serious, possibly fatal, disease among infants and juveniles.   Those who 
would be harmed by this policy are, disproportionately, short-lifespanned, as compared to 
those who would be benefited.).    
 
The insight that short lifespan constitutes a kind of lifetime well-being poverty 
can also be integrated into policy choice in other ways than through a “disparate impact” 
test.   For example, agencies undertaking cost-benefit analysis might use a greater 
monetary valuation of life for children’s lives.  Or, reducing juvenile mortality might be 
generally taken as a high-priority goal of health care and development policy.  To a 
substantial extent, policymakers do already appreciate the distributive significance of 
reducing juvenile mortality; but there is no consensus basis for doing so within the 
scholarly literature on equality and poverty.   As David Hulme and Andrew Sheppard 
explain: 
 
A key conceptual challenge for the study of chronic poverty …. is how to treat those who 
die preventable deaths. These need to be incorporated in our analysis as they experience the most 
acute form of deprivation…. This must be included or a household whose young children die may 
be reported as escaping poverty when a similar household that manages to raise all its children … 
is seen as ‘failing’ to escape from poverty as its income/consumption levels per capita are lower 
because of its larger size and higher dependency ratio. .. .  Concepts from the health sciences, such 
as disability adjusted life years [a kind of QALY], may provide a basis for starting to think 
through this theoretical frontier.121 
 
Lifetime welfarism provides a firm normative basis for the cutting-edge poverty 
measures that Hulme and Sheppard propose, and for policy tests that give extra weight to 
lifesaving among the young -- be these in the form of proxies and presumptions, or in the 
form of more a systematic scheme of distributive weights, a topic to which we now turn. 
 
 2. Distributive Weights and other Integrated Policy-Analytic Tools 
 
 A substantial body of scholarship discusses the possibility of developing policy-
evaluation tools that would be sensitive to both considerations of overall well-being or 
efficiency (unlike inequality or poverty measures) and distributive considerations (unlike 
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cost-benefit analysis or QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis), and would incorporate 
“distributive weights” or some such device to systematically structure tradeoffs between 
overall well-being and equity.122  Administrative agencies in the U.S., by contrast with 
agencies in some other countries, do not currently employ distributionally sensitive 
policy-evaluation tools of this sort.   They should consider doing so -- at least once tools 
that have sufficiently low decision costs and are sufficiently transparent to agency 
overseers are developed.123   
 
 The questions whether well-being should be measured on a lifetime and 
sublifetime basis, and whether an ex post or ex ante perspective should be adopted, are 
absolutely fundamental to designing a distributionally sensitive procedure for policy 
analysis.  These questions have surfaced, most clearly, in the scholarship authored by 
health economists that proposes incorporating equity weights in QALY-based analysis. 
Erik Nord proposes that equity weights, here, should take the form of “severity” 
weights.124 The basic idea is that a change in an individual’s health should be weighted to 
account for his current health condition.   Providing a .1-QALY improvement to an 
individual currently at QALY level .2 should count for more than providing the same 
improvement to an individual currently at level .4.   More generally, we can estimate an 
individual’s expected QALYs in each future year, in the status quo and given some 
policy intervention.  The expected improvement in the individual’s QALYs in each year, 
provided by the policy, should be weighted to take account of the level of expected 
QALYs that the individual would otherwise receive, in the status quo. 
 
 [Imagine that] a person’s utilities in the next five years in case of non-intervention are expected to 
be 0.7, .7, .6, .5, and 0.0 (dead), and the utilities would be .8 in all 5 years (and then dead) in case 
of intervention …. The severity approach implies the application of severity weights . . . to each of 
these annual utility gains.125 
 
From the perspective of lifetime, ex post, welfarism, Nord’s proposal is doubly 
problematic: first, for making the distributive weight applied to a health change a 
function of the annual rather than lifetime health status of the affected individual; and, 
second, for applying the weights to expected changes in individuals’ expected annual 
QALYs in each future year, thus implicitly adopting an “ex ante” account of 
distributional sensitivity under uncertainty. 
 
 The health economist Alan Williams disagrees with the sublifetime focus of 
Nord’s proposal. Williams’ suggestion, the so-called “fair innings” proposal, is that 
fairness concerns the distribution of lifetime QALYs.  “A powerful part of the rhetoric 
                                                 
122 The literature on equity-weighted QALYs is large.  For an overview, see F. Sassi et al., Equity and the 
Economic Evaluation of Healthcare, 5 HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT, no. 3 (2001).  On distributionally 
weighted cost-benefit analysis, see Johansson-Stenman, supra note 114; Ian W.H. Parry et al., The 
Incidence of Pollution Control Policies (NBER Working Paper 11438), at 26-31.  
123 On decision costs and transparency as desiderata for administrative policy analysis tools, see generally 
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 22, at 80-88, 122-23. 
124 For a recent discussion by Nord, see Erik Nord, Concerns for the Worse Off: Fair Innings versus 
Severity, 60 SOC. SCI. MED. 257 (2005). 
125Id. at 259.  
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about equity in health care employs the notion of equality applied to people’s whole 
lifetime experiences and not just to their current situation.”126  Williams proposes using 
survey research to determine how much population life expectancy citizens are willing to 
sacrifice for the sake of equalizing life expectancy.  This research would generate 
weighting factors, which would be applied to expected QALY changes depending on the 
expected lifetime QALYs of those affected.  From the perspective of ex post lifetime 
welfarism, Williams’ proposal for equity-weighted QALY analysis is a significant 
improvement over Nord’s, but it is still marred by its ex ante focus.  “The fair innings 
weight applied to health gains of each individual is defined as a function of his/her 
present expected lifetime QALYs . . . .”127 
 
 What would a better approach be?  First, at least ideally, distributively sensitive 
policy analysis should consist in the application of a social welfare function. It should 
consist in “SWF” analysis.  This proposal is less utopian than it may seem.  The SWF is 
the best, systematic intellectual framework currently available for considering both the 
distributional and overall-welfare impacts of policies.  As already mentioned, the 
scholarly literature on optimal taxation pervasively employs the SWF framework128; 
much of the non-tax literature on distributive weighting draws on that framework as 
well129; and there is some scholarly work that actually considers specific non-tax policy 
proposals using SWFs.130   A crucial issue to be overcome, in rendering SWF analysis a 
feasible and sufficiently transparent tool for government bodies, is to specify the form of 
the SWF.  Should it be prioritarian or comparativist? What should its parameters be?  The 
so-called Atkinsonian family of SWFs is perhaps most widely used by scholars, and is a 
prioritarian SWF (with the degree of priority to welfare gains for worse-off individuals 
captured by an inequality aversion parameter ε). 131 The rank-weighted SWF, 
corresponding to the popular Gini coefficient, is a kind of comparativist SWF.132  Thus a 
first stab at SWF analysis would evaluate policies using the Atkinsonian SWF (with a 
range of values of ε) and the rank-weighted SWF. 
 
 Second, distributively sensitive policy analysis should consider a variety of 
sources of well-being (up to the limits of feasibility, of course).  QALY analysis, equity-
weighted or not, is problematic for these purposes because it ignores income 
differences.133   A better approach would be to take account of longevity, health and 
income.  Each individual’s lifetime utility would be a function of his health status and his 
                                                 
126 Williams, supra note 28, at 120. 
127 Aki Tsuchiya, QALYs and Ageism: Philosophical Theories and Age Weighting, 9 HEALTH ECON. 57, 62 
(2000) (emphasis added). 
128 See [to be filled in] 
129 See, e.g., Han Bleichrodt et al., Equity Weights in the Allocation of Health Care: The Rank-Dependent 
QALY Model, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 157 (2004); Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Individual Utility and 
Social Welfare, 17 J. HEALTH ECON. 39 (1998); Lars Lindholm et al., An Epidemiological Approach 
Towards Measuring the Trade-off Between Equity and Efficiency in Health Policy, 35 HEALTH POLICY 205 
(1996); Lars Peter Osterdal, Axioms for Health Care Resource Allocation, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 679 (2005); 
Adam Wagstaff, QALYs and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 21 (1991);  
130 See Parry et al., supra note 122, at 27-28 (citing sources). 
131 See, e.g., BOJER, supra note 55, at 109-110. 
132 See Adler & Sanchirico, supra note 7. 
133 See Adler, supra note 76. 
 63
income in each period.  In effect, this suggestion synthesizes the QALY literature on 
distributive sensitivity, which focuses on health differences; and the optimal tax and cost-
benefit literatures, which focus on income and consumption differences.  To be sure, in 
deriving an individual’s lifetime utility from his health, income and longevity, we need a 
utility function.  The existing literature often posits a utility function based on certain 
axiomatic properties (for example, declining marginal utility of income); a better 
approach, one I have discussed elsewhere, would be to use survey research about well-
being to calibrate the utility function.134  
 
 Finally -- and this is where lifetime welfarism plus the ex post perspective comes 
into play -- SWF analysis should take the form of probabilistic population profile 
analysis.  A population profile is a set of individual life histories, consisting of a 
determinate income, health, and longevity trajectory for each individual.  The status quo 
consists in a probability distribution over population profiles.  A policy intervention 
perturbs this probability distribution, changing the population profile in some states by 
changing some individual(s)’ life histories.   A utility function maps each life history onto 
a utility. For a given SWF, be it the Atkinsonian SWF, the rank-weighted SWF, or some 
other, we calculate the expectation of the SWF in the status quo, and its expectation with 
the policy. 
 
 I discuss probabilistic population profile analysis at much greater length in other 
work.135  My aim, here, is simply to sketch the approach and to suggest that it flows 
naturally from the general position argued for in this Article.  If we take seriously the 
thought that distributively sensitive policy analysis should consist in SWF analysis, then -
- given lifetime, ex post welfarism --  we should take seriously the suggestion that 
probabilistic population profile analysis is the appropriate template for the SWF 
approach.   
 
It is possible, I suppose, that a different template is optimal.  Perhaps, for 
example, probabilistic population profile analysis is too computationally demanding.   
Magnus Johannesson argues, along these general lines, against an ex post approach to 
equity-weighted QALYs. 
  
From the ex post perspective, the equity weights have to be applied to all possible health profiles 
before they are multiplied by the probabilities of the different profiles …. If, for instance, an 
individual has a 50% chance of living 20 years in full health and a 50% chance of living 40 years 
in full health, the equity weights have to be applied to the 20 and 40 years, respectively, before the 
equity-weighted QALYs of each health profile are multiplied by .5.  This implies that it would be 
much more impractical to take into account ex post equity than ex ante equity.136 
 
Yet current policy-analysis techniques often involve extensive, probabilistic, calculations. 
Consider  toxic risk assessment, which relies upon complicated probabilistic models of 
the different steps by which a toxin is disseminated to the population, and uses 
                                                 
134 See Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875 (2006).  
135 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
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573, 574 (2001). 
 64
computationally demanding techniques such as Monte Carlo analysis to synthesize the 
different models. The biggest hurdle to SWF analysis by agencies would seem to be the 
normative task of specifying a particular SWF and individual utility function, not the 
modeling task of estimating the possible distribution of the determinants of well-being 
and applying the SWF “ex post” rather than “ex ante.”  In any event, probabilistic 
population profile analysis deserves serious attention.   Other templates for SWF analysis 
should be seen as second-best.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Should equality be evaluated from a lifetime or sublifetime perspective?  I have 
engaged this question within the framework of welfarism -- taking equality of well-being 
as the goal of egalitarianism -- and have argued for the lifetime view, given both standard 
and revisionary accounts of personal identity over time.   I have also surveyed the 
multiple implications of the lifetime view for law and policy: for the measurement of 
equality, the measurement of poverty, the design of redistributive taxes, the question 
whether non-tax instruments should be used for redistribution, and the nature of “suspect 
classes” and distributively sensitive policy tools. 
 
 The reader may not share my view that welfarism and the “SWF” framework 
provide insight into problems of social choice.   She might prefer to ask: given some non-
well-being currency for equality (for example, “resources” or “capabilities”), should we 
seek to equalize lifetime or sublifetime holdings of that currency?  Or, she might be 
sympathetic to welfarism but be unpersuaded by the case in favor of a lifetime view 
(which, like much normative argument, is holistic rather than deductive -- there is 
nothing logically flawed or flatly incoherent about the sublifetime view).   But I hope the 
reader does agree that the time-slice question is a vital one, not just for philosophers and 
theoretical economists, but for legal scholars, applied economists, public health scholars, 
and policymakers too. We cannot think seriously about how to measure and alleviate 
inequality without engaging that question.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
